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ABSTRACT 
An All-Optical Network (AON) is a network in which data does not undergo optical-
to-electrical (O-E) or electrical-to-optical (E-O) conversion within the network. Al­
though AONs are a viable technology for future telecommunication and data networks, 
little attentions has been devoted to the intrinsic differences between AONs and existing 
existing electro-optic/electronic networks in issues of security management. Without O-
E-0 conversion, many security vulnerabilities that do not exist in traditional networks 
are created. Transparency and non-regeneration features make attack detection and lo­
calization difficult. However, it is important to detect and localize an attack connection 
quickly in a transparent AON. 
Among all attack methods, crosstalk attack has the highest damage capabilities. 
Therefore, we specifically focus on diagnosis of crosstalk attacks in this dissertation. We 
show that it is possible to effectively reduce the number of monitors while still retaining 
all diagnostic capabilities. We make the following contributions: 
1. We provide a crosstalk attack model and a monitoring model. 
2. Based on these models, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions for both, a 
signle-attack and more than one (i.e., fc-crosstalk) attack diagnostic network. The 
key ideas used in our solution are to employ the status of existing connections 
along with that of test connections as diagnostic data. 
3. We develop efficient monitor placement policies, test connection setup policies, 
and routing policies for such a network. These conditions lead to efficient fc-attack 
xiii 
detection and diagnosis algorithms. 
4. Finally, we analyze the performance of these algorithms. 
By these conditions and policies, we prove that the concept of a sparse monitor 
system for monitoring and localizing crosstalk attacks in AON is not only possible, but 
also feasible. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Computer networks have changed the world dramatically in the last century, and will 
continue to do so in the near future. Among all existing networks, optical networks are 
emerging as the predominant transport layer technology for telecom service providers, 
replacing traditional networks in this role [1, 2, 11, 16, 17, 24, 28]. An All-Optical 
Network (AON) is a new technology that provides very high bit rates. An AON is 
a network where the user-network interface is optical and the data does not undergo 
optical-to-electrical-to-optical (O-E-O) conversion within the network [16, 28]. AONs 
are attractive because they deliver very high data rates, and support a broad class of 
applications. The ability to route large amounts of data and access different channels 
makes AON a very appealing option for providing very high-rate access in WANs, MANs, 
and even LANs. 
1.1 Features of All-Optical Network 
All-Optical networks exist in today's research environments in two types: time-
division-multiplexed (TDM) networks and wavelength-division-multiplexed (WDM) net­
works [11]. In this dissertation, we only focus on the AON employing WDM. Fiber 
bandwidth is divided into optical wavelengths using the WDM method, and each wave­
length can support 10Gb/s or higher data rate. Thus, one feature of AONs is the fact 
that they are typically used to carry extremely high data rates. The very high data 
rates enabled by all-optical technology have four important security ramifications: 
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1. Even attacks that are short and infrequent can result in large amounts of data 
being corrupted or compromised. 
2. End users may choose to retain protocols designed for slower traditional networks. 
While such protocols perform well in the domains for which they were intended, 
the use of such protocols at very high speeds over long distances will allow effective 
service denial attacks using different methods. 
3. The combination of large physical spans typical of wide-area networks with very 
high data rates produces high latencies. Such latencies imply that large amounts 
of data may be beyond the reach of anti-attack measures after an attack has been 
identified. 
4. Transparency is another feature of AON with important implications in matters 
of security. 
1.2 Security Problem of All-Optical Network 
Emerging AONs are a viable technology for future telecommunication and data net­
works, and how to provide a high quality and reliable service for customers is studied 
in [12, 26, 27, 29, 39]. However, the high data rate feature of AON also brings new 
attack vulnerability problems and require new counter-measure techniques. Unfortu­
nately, their intrinsic security differences from existing electro-optic and electronic net­
works have received attention only recently. Security in AONs is an important research 
area, and it is different from communication and computer security in general. While 
much of the work in the security area is concentrated on privacy and authentication 
[9, 14, 25, 32, 38], physical layer security of data in AONs is becoming more and more 
important [16, 30, 31]. This is because the feature of AONs that requires a new security 
concept relates primarily to AON physical characteristics. 
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AONs introduce new physical layer mechanisms that change potential models of at­
tack from those that are well known for traditional electronic networks [3]. AONs are 
typically used to carry extremely high data rates. Moreover, AONs' transparency char­
acteristic means that data does not undergo optical-to-electrical or electrical-to-optical 
conversion. Thus, connections in such networks are only amplified, but not regenerated 
at any intermediate components [27]. This transparency characteristic has many ad­
vantages in certain aspects, for example, greater flexibility in switch designing, much 
higher data rates in wide area networks (WANs), metropolitan area networks (MANs), 
and local area networks (LANs), etc. However, it also creates many security vulnerabil­
ities that do not exist in traditional networks. In a network with regeneration ability, 
an anomalous connection will lose its attack capability after passing through an inter­
mediary node, while in a network without regeneration ability, a malicious connection 
can propagate from its primary source to other nodes without losing its attack capabil­
ity. Transparency and non-regeneration features make attack detection and localization 
much more difficult. 
Here we describe all possible attack types: 
1.2.1 Possible Attacks 
Attack upon a network can be broadly categorized into six areas: 
1. Traffic analysis attack: Based on the observation that the ciphertext length 
usually reveals the plaintext length, attackers can get valuable information from 
networks by tapping into fibers. If the attacker can get an index of all the docu­
ments from somewhere, he can compare the encrypted lengths of the documents 
and their request strings to the lengths of the observed request and document. A 
match in lengths between the lengths of an encrypted document and the observed 
document as well as the encrypted document request and the observed request 
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indicates a very likely match between the unencrypted forms of the documents. 
This attack reveals which documents a client received. 
2. Eavesdropping: This occurs when an attacker covertly listens in on traffic to 
get sensitive information. It exploits broadcast packet-switched networks, and is 
effective and efficient. This attack focuses particularly on user IDs and passwords 
and is favored by insiders and privileged users looking to expand their privilege. 
This attack has similar characteristics with traffic analysis: the attacker analyzes 
the traffic and attempts to degrade its quality in both cases. 
3. Data Delay: The attacker intercepts the data sent by the user to use it later. 
AONs are somewhat immune to delay attacks owing to the lack of optical memory, 
and delay attacks are therefore ignored. 
4. Spoofing: This attack is defined as acquisition of privilege, capabilities, trust, and 
anonymity by pretending to be a more privileged or trusted process. This attack 
includes masquerading and Trojan Horse attacks. It exploits trust, unreliable 
addresses, and weak authentication. Also, it may exploit sophisticated attack 
scripts. Mostly, this attack is only used above data link layer. Thus, we don't 
focus on such attack in this dissertation. 
5. Service Denial: This attack deprives a user or an organization of the services of 
a resource that they would normally expect to have. Typically, the loss of service 
is the inability of a particular network service, such as e-mail, to be available or 
the temporary loss of all network connectivity and services. In the worst cases, for 
example, a web site accessed by millions of people can occasionally be forced to 
temporarily cease operation. A denial of service attack can also destroy programs 
and files in a computer system. Although usually intentional and malicious, a 
denial of service attack can sometimes happen accidentally. A denial of service 
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attack is a type of security breach to a computer system that does not usually 
result in the theft of information or other security loss. However, these attacks 
can cost the target person or company a great deal of time and money. In AONs, 
the optical signal may be disrupted by the attackers. 
6. Quality of Service (QoS) Degradation: The attacker overpowers legitimate 
optical signals with attack signals and may exploit crosstalk sensitive optical de­
vices. This can be used to degrade or deny services. 
Not all these attacks can affect the physical layer. In this dissertation, we only focus 
on those attacks that can be applied on the physical layer, such as traffic analysis and 
eavesdropping, service denial, and QoS degradation. 
1.3 AON Attack Types 
Generally, there are three main differences between an attack and a failure: 
1. Attacks may spread to many users and many parts of the network, while a com­
ponent failure only affects those connections passing through it; 
2. Attacks attempt to avoid detection, while failures cannot do that; 
3. Rerouting traffic connections using a scheme to tolerate hardware failure cannot 
solve the problems caused by an attack connection. 
Because many AON components are premature [16], relatively high crosstalk between 
WDM channels within existing components appears to be a particularly important se­
curity problem. Crosstalk can be exploited either to tap communications or to perform 
service disruption by injecting malicious signals into a network. Optical amplifiers under 
attack by jammers may cease to amplify and thus lead to service disruption. Although 
many AON components such as fibers and amplifiers also exist in electro-optic networks, 
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transparency makes their vulnerabilities more important for physical security than in a 
network with regeneration capability. 
AON attacks can be divided into two different types: 
1. Service disruption attack. It includes service denial attack and QoS degrada­
tion attack. Physically, this type of attack includes three different attacks: 
(a) Fiber Attacks. Fibers ideally propagate light on different wavelengths with 
only frequency dependent delay and attenuation, and have very low radiation 
loss. Under normal operating conditions, there is a negligible radiation of 
power from the fiber. However, unprotected fiber is very vulnerable against 
any attacker with physical access (e.g., service is easily disrupted by cutting 
or bending a fiber). 
(b) Optical Amplifier Attacks. Optical amplifiers are critical and necessary 
components for AONs, and the erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) is com­
monly used in current optical networks. EDFA consists of an optical fiber 
having a core doped with the rare-earth element erbium. Light from one or 
more external semiconductor lasers in either of two pump bands, 980 nm or 
1480 nm, is coupled into the fiber, exciting the erbium atoms. Optical signals 
at wavelengths between about 1530 and 1620 nm entering the fiber stimulate 
the excited erbium atoms to emit photons at the same wavelength as the in­
coming signal. This amplifies a weak optical signal to higher power. EDFAs 
can simultaneously amplify signals over a range of wavelengths, making them 
compatible with wavelength-division-multiplexed (WDM) systems. However, 
the nature of EDFA operation in WDM communication links and nodes can 
lead to a phenomenon known as gain competition, whereby multiple indepen­
dent WDM wavelengths share a limited pool of available upper-state photons 
within the fiber. The result is that a stronger user (possibly an attacker) 
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can deprive a weaker user of photons, thus reducing the weaker user's gain, 
as shown in Figure 1.1. This gain competition, combined with the fact that 
fiber has extremely low loss, means that EDFA is susceptible to power jam­
ming from remote locations. In some cases, an attacker can cause service 
denial to many other users from a legitimate network access point by this 
way. 
Power 
Attacker 
\ Gain Robbed 
/ i n  i m i  1 / 1  
Legal Connections 
Figure 1.1 Gain competition 
(c) Switching Node Attacks. Current wavelength selective switches (WSSs) 
have significant crosstalk levels. Crosstalk causes signals to leak onto un­
intended outputs and permits inputs to cause interference on other optical 
signals going through these devices. The level of crosstalk depends greatly 
upon the particular components and architecture of a switch. In most cases, 
the leakage of power is only -20dB (e.g., acousto-optical switch) to -30dB 
(most other switch types) [7, 13]. However, crosstalk is additive and thus the 
aggregate effect of crosstalk over a whole AON may be much worse than the 
effect of a single point of crosstalk. An attacker could inject a very strong 
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signal into the switch. Although only a small fraction of it leaks onto another 
channel, a sufficiently powerful signal modulated in a malicious way can be 
highly disruptive, as shown in Figure 2.1. This is the attack that we mainly 
focus on in this dissertation. We will define such attacks, and carefully model 
them in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
2. Tapping Attacks. This attack includes both eavesdropping attacks and traffic 
analysis attacks. Physically, there are two different attacks in this class. 
(a) Fiber and EDFA Attacks. An attacker with physical access to the fiber 
can retrieve part of a signal with little disruption by slightly bending the fiber. 
However, at high signal levels (e.g., at the output of an EDFA), fibers exhibit 
some crosstalk which may be used for tapping by obtaining a position of the 
signal on the fiber. In EDFA, the gain competition among signals occurs very 
rapidly, thus tapping can be achieved by observing cross-modulation effects. 
Also, tapping combined with jamming can lead to service denial attacks (e.g., 
an attacker can tap a signal and then inject a signal downstream of the tapping 
point). This is called as correlated jamming, and is shown in Figure 1.2. Such 
an attack is particularly pernicious compared to the effect of an uncorrelated 
jamming attack of the same jamming power. 
(b) Switching Node Attacks. Because crosstalk signals exist in switches, an 
attacker can get such crosstalk signals easily by accessing the switch, although 
the crosstalk signal power is at a low level. Figure 1.3 gives an example of 
this kind of attack. The attacker's connection, which uses wavelength A1; is 
from host A to host B. The leakage of a normal connection, from host C to 
host D, is routed onto the bottom fiber. At the same time, the amplifier on 
this fiber only amplifies signals that are supposed to be on this fiber. Since 
there is now a connection on the bottom fiber, the amplifier on this fiber still 
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Normal route 
Jamming point 
Tapping point 
Tapping Route Amplifier 
Figure 1.2 Example of a correlated jamming attack 
operates. But, if host A does not transmit any power on this fiber, then the 
only signal on this fiber is the leakage of normal connection from C to D, and 
host B can easily detect the sensitive call between C and D. 
Demultiplexer Switch (Xl ) 
To Host D From Host C 
Power Leakage 
from connection 
C to D Amplifier 
Attacker 
From Host A 
Attacker 
Multiplexer To Host B 
X 
Switch CkD Node i 
Figure 1.3 Example of tapping attack using switches 
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1.4 Motivation: Issues in Crosstalk Attack Diagnostic Algo­
rithms 
Today's commercial optical networks provide extremely limited attack management. 
Although optical networking is one of the fastest growing areas in networking, even 
theoretical attack management research in the optical domain only scratches the surface. 
There has been some work [6, 16, 30, 31] in the area of attack localization in AONs, 
and some detection methods have been proposed. However, these papers do not dis­
cuss whether these methods guarantee the localization of every attack connection. If 
a method cannot guarantee the diagnosis, normal connections incur a risk of being at­
tacked by those undiscovered attack connections. Moreover, these papers assume that 
all nodes are equipped with monitors. 
Other studies [4, 15] describe the capability of an optical monitoring module. Gen­
erally, an optical monitor can measure single connection optical power as well as its 
optical SNR (signal to noise ratio). However, it is expected that such a monitor device 
will remain expensive in the near future. Therefore, to install a monitor at each node in 
the network is not an attractive and efficient option. 
Some methods [10, 19, 20] develop probabilistic approaches for fault diagnosis in 
networks. Instead of localizing the exact faulty components, these approaches give the 
most likely fault set. However, there are some drawbacks of these approaches if we 
apply them to our attack localization problem. The most important one is that these 
approaches only give the most likely set instead of determining the exact location of the 
source. We still need further steps to analyze where the exact location of the source is, 
and the time consumed by the further analysis may result in a further data loss. 
Similarly, the schemes for partially diagnosable systems [36] (some faulty units may 
not be detected), excess-diagnosable systems [18, 37] (some fault-free units may be 
incorrectly diagnosed), and sequentially diagnosable systems [34] (assume that multiple 
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faults do not occur simultaneously, which is not true for attacks) cannot be applied to 
our problem. 
Supervisory connection concepts have also been proposed. A network management 
system using supervisory connections [21, 22] can detect and monitor the performance of 
the devices in the network. The advantage of this scheme is that a monitor device can be 
put in a remote place. The major drawback of such a scheme is that extra supervisory 
connections are needed to send control signal and detection data. However, this method 
provides the necessary technique required by sparse monitoring concept. 
In the field of system-level diagnosis as applied to a complex multiprocessor system, 
the diagnosis strategy is to let different processor systems to test each other and identify 
the faulty units using the test results [35]. Although no system fault detection and 
location methods can be applied in our problem directly, the testing concept is still 
helpful. Because a network management system using supervisory connections can detect 
and monitor the performance of network devices remotely, detecting attack sources is not 
necessarily equivalent to putting monitors at all nodes. We know that those connections 
affected by an attack can provide valuable information about the distribution of attack 
locations. If we can monitor all the connections in the network, we may obtain the 
necessary information needed for our diagnostic purpose. If normal connections cannot 
provide sufficient information, we can derive the monitoring information from existing 
test connections. From previous research [23], we notice that generally the number of 
idle wavelengths in a network is very large. For example, in a 4 x 4 mesh-torus network if 
the connection load of each source-destination pair is 0.3 and the number of wavelengths 
on each link is 8, then there is more than 70% probability that there will be about 5 idle 
wavelengths on each link. This information is helpful in establishing a test connection. 
Moreover, existing connections can also be monitored for malicious attacks. These two 
together allow us to design an efficient diagnostic system. 
Although attack monitoring and localization is important for the security of AON, 
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unfortunately, neither a clear attack model nor a monitor model has yet been established 
in previous studies. We seek to close the gap by addressing some of the fundamental 
research issues and building an attack model as well as a monitor model that could be 
incorporated in the products as a result of this research effort. Ultimately, we intend to 
provide quantitative answers to questions about the level of resources needed to support 
modern attack management system. Our research in attack-diagnostic problem broadly 
lies in three areas: (i) modeling (i.e., how to model crosstalk attacks); (ii) character­
ization and algorithms (i.e., how to devise methods for detection and localization of 
crosstalk attacks); and (iii) policies (i.e., how to implement the various steps involved in 
the diagnosis of crosstalk attacks). 
• Crosstalk Attack Modeling: In the area of modeling, our research will be driven 
by the following issues. How do attack models differ from fault models? How are 
coordinated attacks best modeled? How can a network measure and detect denial-
of-service attacks? In our research, we will build attack models using the physical 
level characterization performed by others [6, 13, 16, 30, 31]. 
To establish clear models for crosstalk attacks and monitor nodes, we study the 
crosstalk attack special properties and analyze the power levels for attack signals, 
affected signals, and unaffected signals according to the origination and propaga­
tion mechanism for crosstalk attacks. We have observed the difference in the power 
levels among these signals. According to these difference power levels, we assume 
different signals have different attack capabilities. With these assumptions, a rea­
sonable crosstalk attack model is established. Furthermore, power-detection based 
monitoring techniques have also been discussed, and a power-detection monitor 
model is proposed, too. 
• Characterization and Algorithms: One problem addressed in this dissertation 
is whether we can find out the attack source. To locate all co-existing attacks in 
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an AON simultaneously is another question. To answer these questions, we find 
out the necessary and sufficient conditions for one-crosstalk-attack diagnosable 
network and ^-crosstalk-attack diagnosable network. Another question addressed 
in this dissertation is how we can locate the actual attack sources. To solve this 
problem, we develop a diagnosis algorithm. We define relation matrices and cor­
responding operations on them to carry out the diagnosis process. We also study 
the complexities of these algorithms. 
• Sparse Monitoring Policies: An interesting problem in the attack diagnosis 
system is whether a sparse monitor network can provide sufficient information for 
detection and localization purpose. Based on the necessary and sufficient con­
ditions, we develop solutions that only require sparse monitors in the network. 
It is shown that these solutions are sufficient to detect a single crosstalk-attack. 
We also develop methods for ^-crosstalk-attack diagnosable system. Thus, sparse 
monitoring concept is not only possible, but is also feasible. 
1.5 Contribution and Outline of This Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Crosstalk attack is studied in 
Chapter 2. Its characteristic and attack capability are also described. Based on current 
available techniques, we study five possible anti-attack mechanisms. We select one, a 
power detection method for detecting any possible crosstalk attack. Special security 
requirements for a solution are also presented in this chapter. 
An interesting problem in attack diagnosable system is whether a sparse monitor 
network can provide sufficient information for detection and localization purpose. This 
problem has been partially studied in [10, 19, 20, 21, 22]. However, these papers do 
not provide a suitable solution for attack detection, as mentioned earlier. We present 
a complete crosstalk attack model in Chapter 3, which includes the crosstalk attack 
14 
propagation. We also develop a monitor model for the detection purpose in the same 
chapter according to current available detection techniques while making reasonable 
assumptions. 
Based on these models, a monitor-segment concept is proposed in Chapter 4. We 
proved a necessary and sufficient condition for a single-crosstalk-attack diagnostic net­
work using this concept. Since in most cases, attackers tend to introduce more than one 
attack signal into a network simultaneously, localizing more than one co-existing attack 
signals in an AON is more important in practice. Thus, management of more than one 
crosstalk attack occurrence in an AON is also studied in the second part of Chapter 
4. The question we attempt to answer is what is the necessary and sufficient condition 
for ^-crosstalk-attack diagnostic network. We observe that some of the conclusions that 
can be made for a single-crosstalk-attack only do not hold for the general case. To solve 
this problem, we develop a new segment stating monitoring and interpretation model, 
and extend the single-crosstalk-attack diagnosis condition to ^-crosstalk-attack diagno­
sis condition using the individual monitor-segment status. With these conditions, we 
can determine whether an attack can be localized or not. 
Next we tackle the question of exact location of the attack source. We develop a 
diagnosis algorithm that is represented as a set of matrix operations to describe the 
relationship among the monitor-segment status for the existing connections in Chapter 
4. By manipulating these matrices, we can accurately locate the attack sources. It is 
shown that the complexity of these algorithms is 0((\M\ x dM)2 x |C|). Here \M\ is 
the total number of monitors in the network, dM is the maximum degree of all monitor 
nodes, and \C\ is the total number of existing and test connections in the network. 
Three sparse monitor placement policies and corresponding routing policies to detect 
attacks are studied in Chapter 5. Although the two issues are inter-related, the basic 
idea of our algorithms is that we first determine the monitor placement policy and then 
design the corresponding routing policy and test connection setup policy. 
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The first policy requires that all neighbor nodes for a non-monitor node should be 
monitor nodes. An alternative policy tries to reduce the total number of monitors re­
quired in a network. Our policy only requires that one of a non-monitor node's neighbor 
must be a monitor node. It is shown that both solutions are sufficient for a single-
crosstalk-attack diagnostic network. Based on the ^-crosstalk diagnosis condition, we 
propose the third policy for two-crosstalk-attack diagnostic network. 
Our solutions do not require that every node be a monitor node. Thus an attack 
diagnostic network can be a sparse monitor network. Several examples are also presented 
in the chapter. 
The conclusions of our research and directions for future research are presented in 
Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 CROSSTALK ATTACK FEATURES AND 
MONITORING TECHNIQUES 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are several kind of attacks that can disturb normal 
AON communication. Some of these attacks, such as fiber cuts, can be treated as 
a component failure. Other attacks, like correlated jamming, can only affect those 
connections that share the same link or the same node with the attack connections. 
Among all these attack methods, crosstalk attack has the highest damage capabil­
ities. In this dissertation, we only focus on the crosstalk attack. The attacker injects 
a malicious signal which has very high power energy, far beyond the expected value. 
When this connection passes through a wavelength selective switch, the leakage energy 
(crosstalk) of this malicious connection can be significant and affects the normal con­
nections passing through the same switch. Unlike other attacks, a crosstalk attack can 
affect not only those connections sharing the same link or node with it, but also may 
induce attack capabilities to those connections that are attacked [16]. In this chapter, 
we describe crosstalk attack's origination, its characteristic, and possible anti-attack 
mechanisms. 
2.1 Crosstalk Attack Features 
In this section, we explain the origination of crosstalk attack and its features. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, the crosstalk attack happens at a wavelength switch and only 
affects the normal connections in the same wavelength. The attacker injects a very 
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strong signal (the malicious channel shown in Figure 2.1) into a switch, and the power 
leakage (crosstalk) from the malicious channel is superimposed on a normal channel that 
shares the same wavelength switch (À2 switch). The power of the malicious channel is 
so high that even its power leakage can still greatly disturb the normal channel. It 
is possible that the high energy on one wavelength may affect the signal energy on 
other wavelengths. However, we assume that the probability of such occurrences is low. 
Therefore, we do not pursue this aspect further in this dissertation. 
Figure 2.1 Example of crosstalk attack using wavelength selective switches 
Besides its attack capability, the crosstalk attack has other features. The most impor­
tant is its propagation characteristic. Figure 2.2 shows the crosstalk attack propagation 
mechanism. The original crosstalk attack occurs on node i, which carries connections 1 
and 2. Connection 1 is originally a malicious attack connection. Because of the crosstalk 
attack from connection 1, power of connection 2 is also beyond a certain threshold, so 
connection 2 itself has crosstalk attack capability. Thus, at node j, which carries con­
Normal Channel 
Demultiplexer Multiplexer 
Switch (X.1) 
Switch (k2)  
Node i Crosstalk 
Malicious Channel 
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nection 2 and connection 3, power leakage from connection 2 also superimposes on 
connection 3, and connection 3 is also disturbed. This characteristic makes attack con­
nection localization much more difficult. We cannot safely tell whether a connection is 
a malicious connection based on its attack capability, nor can we locate the source if we 
only depend on where the attack happens. 
Crosstalk from Channel 1 superimposed on Channel 2 
Node i (a switch) 
Channel 1 (A.) 
Channel 2 (X) 
Channel 2 + Channel 1 Crosstalk 
Node j (a switch) 
Channel 3 (X) 
Channel 3 + Crosstalk from 
Crosstalk from (Channel 2 + Channel 1 Crosstalk) (Channel 2 + Channel 1 Crosstalk) 
superimposed on Channel 3 
Figure 2.2 Example of crosstalk attack propagation 
2.2 Security Consideration 
In this dissertation, we discuss AON security requirements. Typically, to solve the 
security problems associated with AONs, we consider the following issues: 
1. Characterization of security vulnerabilities. Security vulnerabilities that are 
specific to AONs stem from the characteristics of the physical devices, such as fiber 
and amplifiers, which are used in AONs. 
2. Prevention of attacks. The avoidance of attacks or the judicious design of 
components and systems to alleviate the security of attacks follows from an un-
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derstanding of security vulnerabilities. 
3. Detection of attacks. Physical security not only requires preventing service 
disruption and tapping attacks, but also detecting the events where attacks have 
not been successfully thwarted. Without such detection, it is difficult to launch 
an appropriate response to attacks. 
4. Localization of attacks. If an attack is detected but its source cannot be lo­
calized, it is difficult to launch an appropriate response. Indeed, the response to 
an attack whose source is not well identified can lead to consequences which may 
be more disruptive than the original attack. For example, as shown in Figure 2.2, 
crosstalk of connection 1 attacks the network by sending an excessively powerful 
signal. Connection 1 and 2 share the same node i, thus connection 2 also may 
become too powerful and disturbs connection 3 at node j. Now, both node % and 
node j may find out the crosstalk attack. Node i may correctly identify the ma­
licious connection as connection 1, while node j may determine connection 2 to 
be the malicious connection. If the network has no means of localizing the source 
of the attack, then node i will disconnect connection 1 and node j will disconnect 
connection 2, which will therefore have been erroneously disconnected. 
5. Response to attacks. Once an attack has been successfully detected and local­
ized, the network management module can determine the appropriate actions to be 
taken to thwart or recover from the attack. To do this effectively, an AON network 
management must be able to differentiate an attack and network traffic problem 
caused by a physical failure. The strategy for protection and restoration service 
from hardware failure is simply using a prepared backup path to re-route the dis­
turbed traffic connections from the failure point [5, 8, 33, 45]. However, re-routing 
traffic connections to tolerate a hardware failure cannot solve the problem caused 
by an attack. For example, consider that an attack caused by connection 1 on node 
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i, which has two connections 1 and 2. If the network management treats such an 
attack as a component failure, then it assumes that node i has failed and reroutes 
these two connections 1 and 2 to some other node, say j. After this rerouting, 
node j will appear as having failed because connection 1 will attack other normal 
connections on node j. The network management system may reroute all these 
channels to some other node k, and so on. Therefore, it is important for node i 
under attack to be able to identify an attack coming from its traffic stream and to 
differentiate it from a physical component failure. 
2.3 Overview of Current Monitoring Methods 
To detect attack signals, a sophisticated optical monitoring technique is required. 
With current techniques, we can monitor and detect some important features of an 
optical signals. Because performance and quality indices of physical optical signals are 
different, the methods used to measure these indices are variable. Typically, a monitor 
device should be capable of measuring the following: signal wavelength, signal power, 
and optical signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Before we describe these parameters, several 
testing methods need to be introduced first. 
1. Power detection. Power detection generally describes the measurement of power 
over a wide band. Thus it may be used to record an increase or decrease in power 
with respect to the expected value. Because we are comparing against an expected 
value, it may take a long time to detect a slight decrease in power. If we use the 
law of large numbers for statistical analysis, then a very long averaging time may 
be necessary to establish with reasonable certitude that a deviation of the sample 
mean from the statistical mean was statistically significant. Some attacks, for 
instance, a combination of in-band jamming attacks that increase average power 
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and out-of-band jamming attacks that decrease power might yield no difference in 
average received power. 
The power detection technique is well-suited in some problems such as amplifier 
failures. It is a basic technique of failure detection in AONs. For an in-band 
jamming attack, a receiver would receive increased power, and a threshold detector 
could detect the jamming attack. 
The power detection technique, however, is not satisfactory in the detection of gain 
competition attacks. For gain competition attacks, the received power may not be 
increased, but rather decreased. Moreover, gain competition attacks can lead to a 
serious SNR degradation problem without a degradation of total signal power. In 
these cases, the power detection technique cannot detect the attack at all. 
2. Optical spectral analyzers (OSAs). OSAs display the spectrum of an optical 
signal. There are many implementations of OSAs. The main difference between 
an OSA and a power detector is that the former can provide much more detailed 
information than the latter, although a bank of specific power detectors can do 
the same job as one OSA. Thus, they may be able to detect a change of spectrum 
shape, even if that change in shape does not entail a change in power over the whole 
channel. However, unless there is significant programming to analyze the output 
of the OSA and map it to the generation of different types of alarms, it is not a 
convenient diagnostic tool for the automatic generation of network alarms as is the 
power detection method. Another drawback is that although OSAs may provide 
more information than power detectors, they still rely on statistical comparisons 
between sample averages and statistical averages. Arguments based on the law of 
large numbers will still imply that infrequent degradations of the signal will not 
be detected or will be detected only after a long time. 
OSAs can detect those jamming attacks that seriously affect the optical spectrum. 
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For detecting a gain competition attack, OSAs can determine the attack wave­
length by analyzing the signal spectrum. 
3. Bit error rate testers (BERTs): BERTs operate by comparing a received 
pattern with the pattern which was known to have been sent. Given the number 
of discrepancies which are found, the BER of the transmission is estimated. The 
time it takes for a BERT to establish the BER will depend on the BER and the 
data rate. For instance, at 1 Gbps, it takes several seconds for a BERT to establish 
with good statistical accuracy that the BER has been degraded from 10~8 to 10-3. 
Another drawback of BERTs is that they only examine a given test data sequence 
when this special sequence is transmitted. They do not test the actual data. 
Therefore, an attack can escape detection for a long time until this attack affects 
a test sequence. Third problem with the BERT is that only data errors can be 
detected by a BERT. Although most attack forms result in signal BER degradation, 
some of the attacks may not affect BER seriously. 
4. Pilot tones: Pilot tones are signals which travel along the same links and nodes 
as the communication payload, but are distinguishable from the communication 
payload. Pilot tones are often at different carrier frequencies than the transmit­
ted signal, but they might also be distinguished from the communication payload 
by certain time slots or certain codes. Their purpose is to detect transmission 
disruptions. If the pilot tones are present, in frequency, in the close vicinity of 
the communication transmissions, they are usually referred to as subcarrier mul­
tiplexed signals that allow the transmission of network signaling or of a pilot tone 
at the same carrier wavelength as the payload signal. The tone may be something 
other than a static tone. The pilot tone may be at a lower or a higher frequency 
than the communication signal. 
The pilot tone technique may not generate an alarm if an attack at a certain 
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wavelength does not affect those carrier wavelengths at which the pilot tones are 
carried. Thus, pilot tones are not effective in detecting jamming attacks unless 
applied to all wavelengths. Moreover, pilot tones themselves can be masked by 
malicious signals. 
Gain competition attacks affect all wavelengths traversing an amplifier. If the pilot 
signals are amplified by the same amplifier as the common signals, then the pilot 
signals can also be affected by such an attack. Otherwise, if the pilot signals are 
amplified separately, then they cannot detect gain competition attack. In some 
cases, the pilot tone technique is not used in detecting gain competition attack 
because such a technique requires detecting a signal at very low SNR levels if the 
signal suffers from some attack or component failure problem. Thus, although the 
pilot tone technique can be efficient in detecting link failure or fiber cut problems, 
it may not be sensitive enough to detect gain competition attack. Moreover, if 
auto-gain-control devices are applied in networks, then the power of pilot tone can 
actually be sufficient to mask the occurrence of gain competition attack. 
5. Optical time domain reflectometers (OTDRs): OTDRs are a special appli­
cation of pilot tones. Rather than analyzing a pilot tone at the point where the 
communication signal is received, the pilot tone's echo is analyzed. OTDRs are 
generally used to diagnose faults, bends, and losses in fibers. Thus, they are usu­
ally better adapted to detecting attacks which involve tampering. However, since 
they operate by reflecting a signal back through the fiber, they may also provide 
information about other attacks that must be taking place. Note that the signal 
used for reflectometry may also be used as a supervisory signal, and therefore may 
share the uses discussed in previous parts. The probe signal may also, for certain 
unmodulated or very simply modulated probe signals, be subject to jamming in 
the same way as pilot tones. 
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By applying OTDRs, jamming attack signals can be returned in the reflections 
and observed. OTDRs use different diagnostic techniques than pilot tones. If 
the OTDR probe signal is modulated, then it is very easy to detect the jamming 
signal super-imposed on the OTDR probe signal. The drawback is that OTDRs 
cannot detect jamming attacks which occur outside the band of the probe signal 
or jamming signals which do not affect the probe signal seriously because of simple 
or non-modulation on the probe signal. 
The detection efficiency for gain competition is dependent on the amplifier struc­
ture. If the amplifier is unidirectional and there is no preamplifier for the OTDR 
probe signal, then it cannot be used to amplify the reflected signals. Therefore, 
OTDRs cannot be used to detect gain competition attack in such networks. Thus, 
bi-directional amplifiers are required for OTDRs. Moreover, preamplifiers for OT­
DRs are also necessary. If these conditions are met, the the gain competition 
attack at the amplifier can be detectable over the reflected OTDR probe signal. 
To detect crosstalk attack, we at least need to know the optical signal power value. 
Also, we hope to establish an effective method of detection that is as simple as possible. 
Most detection techniques discussed above are too complex, although they may be effi­
cient for some special attacks. However, the power detection technique is good enough 
to detect the power value of optical signals, and it is the simplest method among all five 
possible detection techniques. Thus, the power detection technique is selected as the 
major part in our monitor model, which will be described in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 ATTACK MODEL, NODE MODEL, AND 
MONITOR MODEL 
As mentioned earlier, although attack monitoring and localization is important for 
the security of an AON, unfortunately, neither a clear attack model nor a monitor 
model has yet been established. In order to develop a crosstalk attack detection and 
localization method, we first establish a node model, a crosstalk model, and a monitoring 
model based on current techniques and reasonable assumptions. 
3.1 Node Model 
The node is the first important component worthy of discussion, because a crosstalk 
attack can only take place on nodes, not in any other components, such as fibers or 
amplifiers. We assume that every node in our network has the following characteristics: 
1. The node can perform routing and switching. Without the switching capability, 
the node cannot propagate a crosstalk attack to other normal connections. In such a 
case, the node need not be considered as a potential attack propagation node. 
2. Some nodes can support monitoring capability as will be described latter. We 
call a node supporting monitoring capability as a monitor node and a node without this 
capability as a non-monitor node. 
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3.2 Crosstalk Attack Model 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the crosstalk attack connection only affects the same wave­
length connections. The following terms describe our crosstalk attack model: 
1. Up-stream and down-stream neighbor nodes-. For a certain node on a certain con­
nection path, its up-stream neighbor node (UNN) is the previous node on that 
path. Similarly, its down-stream neighbor node (DNN) is the next node on that 
path. In the rest of this dissertation, UNN(node A, connection C) denotes the 
UNN of node A on connection C. Similarly, DNN (node A, connection C) de­
notes the DNN of node A on connection C. Figure 3.1 illustrates two connections 
ci and c2. For connection c1} node n is node m's up-stream node, while node m is 
down-stream node of node n (i.e., DNN(n,ci) = m and UNN(m, c{) = n). For 
connection c2, node n is node m's down-stream node, while node m is up-stream 
node of node n (i.e., UNN(n, c2) = m and DNN(m, c2) = n). 
C, 
-*— 
C , 
(^) : node : Link 
Figure 3.1 Example of up-stream and down-stream neighbor node 
2. According to our crosstalk attack concept, there are different types of connections. 
We explain them separately. 
(a) The original attack flow (OAF) has a much higher energy level than permit­
ted on a normal connection. The leakage of energy at a switch from the attack 
connection influences all other normal connections using the same wavelength 
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on other fibers. The ability of an OAF to influence normal connections is same 
on its path. A node is called a primary attacked node (PAN) if there is an 
OAF originating at, terminating at or passing through this node. 
AFN 
. Link : Non-attack Connection 
(^) : node —: Attack Connection 
Figure 3.2 Example of attack flow and affected flow 
(b) A normal connection sharing a node with the OAF is affected, and this con­
nection is called a secondary attacked flow (SAF). The SAF has limited attack 
capability. That is, if a normal connection C gets affected by an OAF at node 
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u ,  then the connection C  has attack capability only at node D N N ( u ,  C ) ,  and 
we call DNN(u,C) a secondary attacked node (SAN). 
(c) A normal connection influenced by an SAF is called a final attacked flow 
(FAF). The FAF does not have the attack propagation capability. 
(d) A connection not affected by either OAF or SAF is called an attack-free flow 
(AFF). Similarly, a node that is neither a PAN nor a SAN is called an attack-
free node (AFN). The union of AFF, SAF, and FAF is called an innocent 
flow (IF) set. 
As shown in Figure 3.2, connection C\ is the OAF, connection is the 
SAF, connection C3 is the FAF, and connection C4 is AFF. Nodes 1, 2, 
3, and 6 are PANs. Node 5 is SAN. The rest, nodes 4, 7, 8, and 9, are 
AFNs. Connection C\ can propagate its attack to connection C3 by affecting 
connection C2. According to this, it is expected that the OAF pollutes any 
connections passing through the PAN, and the SAF pollutes any normal 
connection passing through a SAN. Connections C2, C3, and C4 are IFs. 
3. Since the OAF, the SAF and the FAF have different attack capabilities, it is 
obviously expected that the power level of these connection channels is as follows: 
P(OAF) » P(SAF) > P(FAF) > P(AFF). 
P ( O A F )  means the power level of OAF, etc. For example, as shown in Figure 3.2, 
f (Ci) > f (<%) > f (C3) > f (Q). 
3.3 Monitor Node Model 
We call a node equipped with a monitor device a monitor node, or a monitor. A 
node without a monitor device is called a non-monitor node. A monitor needs to be as 
29 
simple and cheap as possible. Because crosstalk attacks only change the optical power 
of normal signals, we only need the crosstalk detection method to detect the change in 
signal power; more than that seems unnecessary. According to Chapter 2, detection of 
power levels is simple and meets our detection purpose. Thus, we select power detection 
method as our core technique in the monitor node model. We describe the model in 
more detail below. 
1. A monitor node can monitor all traffic passing through it, including the traffic that 
originates/terminates at the node. 
2. The monitor node can detect the input/output connection power in all parts, 
including its demultiplexer, multiplexer, and switch plane, to see if any power level 
is beyond the expected value. In special cases, when more than one connection's 
power levels are beyond the threshold, our monitor model can treat these cases in 
three different ways, as described in bullet 1. We also use power detection methods 
to monitor the input and output connection signal power levels, as described in 
Chapter 2, and to monitor separate wavelengths in the input and output fibers. 
The crosstalk attack monitoring mechanism for selective wavelength switches is 
shown in Figure 3.3. 
3. If a connection in a state of high power traverses a monitor, then we say that 
this connection is in attack-status at that monitor. A connection can be in an 
attack/non-attack status at a monitor. We use A/À to indicate the attack/non-
attack status of the connection. 
4. One interesting problem is that if there are at least two connections which have 
attack capabilities passing through a same monitor, how does the monitor iden­
tify the difference. Here we give three possibilities and the corresponding three 
responses from a monitor respectively: 
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Monitor 
Device 
(XI) 
Switch (À1) 
Demultiplexer 
Monitor 
Device 
(%2) 
Multiplexer 
Switch (X2) 
Node i 
Figure 3.3 Attack monitoring mechanism for selective wavelength switches 
(a) One connection is an OAF while all the others are SAFs. Because P ( O A F )  >  
P(SAF), the monitor node can detect that one connection has higher power 
than others do, and the monitor considers only this connection (OAF) to have 
attack capability. Thus, we assume that only the OAF will be set A, while 
the other SAFs will be set A. 
(b) More than one connection is a SAF, but none is an OAF. In this situation, 
the monitor can detect several connections which have similar unexpected 
high power. We assume that this monitor sets all SAFs to A. 
(c) Two or more connections are OAFs. In this situation, similar to the above 
assumption, the monitor can detect several connections which have similar 
unexpected high power and set all these connections to A and other connec­
tions to Â. 
Figure 3.4 shows a 3 x 3 mesh network. Connection C\ and Cg are two OAFs. 
Node 2, 4, 6, and 8 are monitors. On node 2, because connection C\ and C6 
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Ci 
C 3 
Ce 
Ci  
C 4 
| | : Monitor node 
: Non-monitor node o 
: Non-attack Connection 
: Attack Connection 
: Link 
Figure 3.4 Different attack connections passing through monitors 
are two OAFs passing through this monitor, connection Ci's status and Ce s 
status will be set as A, while connection C3 will be set as A because it is 
SAF. On node 4, both connection C2 and C4 are SAFs, and no OAF passes 
through node 4. Thus, node 4 will set both C2 and C4 as A. On node 6, OAF 
connection C\ will be set as A while C3 and C4 will be set as Â. On node 8, 
because C2 does not have attack capability on this node, both C2 and C5 will 
be set as A. 
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CHAPTER 4 NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT 
CONDITION FOR CROSSTALK ATTACK 
In previous chapters, we introduced the AON security problem and crosstalk attack 
features. Moreover, we proposed a node model, a crosstalk attack model, and a monitor 
model. As discussed in chapter 3, it is possible to use sparse monitors to create a crosstalk 
diagnostic network management system. In this chapter, we analyze this possibility and 
propose some practical methods to create such system based on our analysis. Before we 
develop an algorithm, we prove that we can always localize all crosstalk attacks in an 
AON with sparse monitors. First, we only focus on a special situation where only one 
crosstalk attack exists on each wavelength in whole network. Later on we extend this 
result to a general case where more than one crosstalk attack exists on each wavelength. 
4.1 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Single Crosstalk At­
tack in the Network 
A network is called one-OAF diagnosable if a single OAF can be always detected 
and localized from all present connections. In this section we discuss the necessary and 
sufficient condition for on e-OAF diagnosable network. 
For a given graph G(V, E), let M denote the set of monitor nodes, and let N denote 
the set of non-monitor nodes, M Ç V, N C V, and M (J N = V. 
On this graph G ( V , E ) ,  several connections are established. Let C  =  R \ J T  denote 
the set of connections in the network, where R is the regular set of connections, and T 
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is the set of test connections. 
Let Ci be a connection consisting of nodes {%, Let U(q) denote 
the set of nodes on connection Cj's path. Then, denotes a one-hop segment (u j  -4-
Uj+i) on connection c%. 
There can be three kind of relations between a monitor and a connection: 
1. Direct-Monitor. A monitor m is a direct-monitor of a connection c if m 6 [/(c); 
for example, as shown in Figure 4.1, monitor m2 is a direct-monitor of connection Ci 
b e c a u s e  m 2  i s  o n  c o n n e c t i o n  c i ' s  p a t h :  m 2  €  U ( c \ ) .  
2. One-Hop Monitor. A monitor m is a one-hop monitor of a connection c if m £ U(c) 
and 3 (u -* m) where u € [/(c); for example, as shown in Figure 4.1, monitor mi is a 
o n e - h o p  m o n i t o r  o f  c o n n e c t i o n  C i  b e c a u s e  m 2  i s  n o t  o n  c o n n e c t i o n  c i ' s  p a t h :  m %  ^  U ( c \ ) ,  
and 3 (2 —>• mi) Ç connection c2 where node 2 € C/(ci). 
3. Non-Monitor: A monitor m is a non-monitor of a connection c if m ^ £7(c) and 
y3 (u —> m) where u € U{c). For example, as shown in Figure 4.1, both monitors m-i and 
m2 are non-monitors of connection c3, because mi,m2 ^ [/(c3) and ^ (it -> mi or m2) 
i n  a n y  e x i s t  c o n n e c t i o n  w h e r e  u  €  U ( c 3 ) .  
Ci 
I I : Monitor Node 
: link 
Figure 4.1 Relation between a monitor and a connection 
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4.1.1 Monitor-Segment 
Monitor-Segment A monitor segment mscij is a one-hop segment when node Uj+1 
is a monitor. Let MSC denote the set of the monitor-segments. Let mscij denote this 
particular monitor segment. Mostly, we use msc to denote a common monitor segment. 
Two monitor segments are shown in Figure 4.2, one is made by connection c2 and 
monitor node mi, denoted by miCg, while the other is made by a one-hop segment on 
connection cly from node 2 to node m2, and monitor node m2, denoted by m2ci_ 
Monitor Segments 
mi 
I I : Monitor Node : link 
Figure 4.2 Attack monitoring mechanism and Monitor-Segment 
A monitor segment msc = (u —> m) is monitoring a connection c : 
1. if the monitor m is a direct-monitor of this connection, while the segment (u -» 
m) e c, or 
2. if the monitor m is a one-hop monitor of a connection c, where u € (7(c), and 
m  ^  U ( c ) .  
For example, in Figure 4.2, monitor m2 is a direct-monitor for connection ci, and 
monitor mi is a one-hop monitor for connection c\. According to our definition, both 
monitor segments mic2 and m2ci are monitoring connection ci, and none of them is 
monitoring connection c3. Let (msc, c) denote this relation between monitor-segment 
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msc and connection c. Consequently, the status of the segment (u —» m) indicated by 
monitor m is the status of the monitor-segment, denoted by S (msc). For example, in 
Figure 4.2, if the status of c2 in monitor mx is indicated as A, then the status of the 
monitor-segment mic2 is A. S (msc) can be either A or À. 
The status of a connection can be either innocent flow (IF) or uncertain. IF 
means that the connection is determined as IF, and uncertain means that the connection 
cannot be determined either as IF or as OAF. Let S(c) denote the status of connection 
c. Table 4.1 shows the relations between a monitor-segment status and its monitoring 
connection's status. 
Table 4.1 Truth Table for monitor-segment and its monitor­
ing/non-monitoring connections 
Relation S  ( m s c )  S(c) 
msc monitoring c 
(msc, c) 
A uncertain 
Â IF 
msc non-monitoring c A IF 
À uncertain 
For a connection c, which is not being monitored by msc, we say that msc has 
non — monitoring relation with c. Table 4.1 shows the relations between a monitor-
segment and its non-monitoring connection. 
Figure 4.3 depicts two special cases of monitor-segments. 
Figure 4.3(1) shows the monitor m as the originating node of the connection c. For 
this case, monitor m and connection c make up a special monitor-segment msc, and 
only connection c is monitored by this monitor-segment, while all other connections are 
n o t  m o n i t o r e d .  I f  S  ( m s c )  =  A ,  a l l  o t h e r  c o n n e c t i o n s  c a n  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  I F .  
Figure 4.3(2) shows the relation between a monitor segment msci and a connection 
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c2, where c% ^ c2, and n, m e t/(c2). In this case, both c% and c2 share the same nodes 
n and m. While it seems that c2 is monitored by msci, in fact the relation between 
connection c2 and the monitor-segment msc\ is non-monitoring. We can explain it in two 
ways. First, according to our definition of monitoring, the only two cases of monitoring 
are either the segment is a part of the monitored connection, or the monitored connection 
does not pass through the monitor. The example provided by Figure 4.3(2) does not fit 
either of these definitions. Second, according to truth table, suppose the status of msci 
is À. We cannot be sure if c2 is IF or not. According to Table 4.1, this is a non-monitor 
relation. 
Cz 
(1). connection c originated from m (2). a connection shares both nodes with a ms 
| | : Monitor node : Link 
Figure 4.3 Special Monitor-Segment 
We can represent the connections and monitors in graph G(V,E) ,  as shown in Fig­
ure 4.4(1), using a bipartite graph G'(V',E'), as shown in Figure 4.4(3), by using the 
connections set up in the network. Figure 4.4(2) shows a graph with all connections 
separated into one-hop segments. For example, c%_i is the first segment of connection 
Ci  shown in  F igure  4 .4 (1 ) .  In  g raph  G'(V' ,E ' ) ,  t he  ve r t i ces  se t  V'  =  {mCi j } \J {Ck}  
consist of the monitor-segments and the connection (i.e., mc^ G MC), and c* G C. For 
example, 3ei2 is a monitor-segment made up by monitor node 3 and one-hop segment 
ci2 shown in Figure 4.4(2). An edge in G' depicts a relation between a monitor segment 
and a connection. In this figure, a directed edge from a monitor-segment msc to a con­
nection c describes the monitoring relation between this pair of monitor-segment and 
connection, and (msc, c) denotes the edge. 
Let T(msc i )  = {c j \ (msc i ,  Cj) G E' }  denote the set of connections monitored by a 
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G h- G 
ta G- •ta 
(1). G(V, E) (2). G(V, E) 
| | : Monitor node - *• : Link 
Figure 4.4 Monitor-Segment Example 
lCit 1 1  Tl  Ci J  
lC4 
3c,z 
3D ' 
3a Ic4 ) 1 ^— 
(3). G'(V\E') 
monitor-segment msCj. Let F 1(cj) = { m s c M m s c .  , q ) 6 -E"} denote the set of monitor-
segments monitoring a connection C;. 
A connection is called Unidentified if we cannot obtain the status of the connection 
directly from the set of all monitor-segments' status in the network. Figure 4.5 shows 
an example to help understand this concept. A network and its connections are shown 
in Figure 4.5. If connection c\ is the OAF, according to the truth table we can identify 
the status for both the monitor-segments and connections, as shown in Table 4.2. The 
monitor-segments can only identify the status of c% and C3 as IF and the status of 
connection c1 as uncertain according to both monitor-segments' results. 
m 
=> 
3c, 
lCz 
(1). G(V, E) (2). G'(V', E') 
| | : Monitor node —•" : Link 
Figure 4.5 Unidentified connection 
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Table 4.2 Status of the connections and the monitor-segments shown in 
Figure 4.5 
monitor-segments S ( m s c )  f(ci) SW SW) 
A uncertain uncertain IF 
S(3C3) A uncertain IF uncertain 
4.1.2 One-Crosstalk-Attack-Diagnosable Conditions 
In this section, we establish the exact diagnosis conditions by using a set of lemmas 
and theorems. 
Lemma 1: In any network, if this system is one-OAF diagnosable, then, 
| Unidentified connection\ < 1. 
Proof. Obvious. • 
Lemma 2: For an arbitrary connection q, if q is Unidentified, then S(msci)  — A for 
V msci € r_1(ci). 
Proof. Suppose one msck € F-1(q) has S(msck) — À. Then, according to Table 4.1, 
S(ci) = IF, and this contradicts the condition of the statement of Lemma. • 
Theorem 1 (Necessary and Sufficient Condition for One-Crosstalk Attack): 
In a network with at most one OAF existing at a time, Vq, Cj € C, q ^ Cj, if 
then for this network with the connection set C, |Unidentified connection\ < 1 holds. 
What this theorem states is that for any arbitrary pair of connections Cj and Cj in 
a given monitor-segment graph G', if the set of monitor-segment of connection c, is not 
the same as the set of monitor-segment of connection c, , then there is no more than one 
Unidentified connection for this network with the connection set C. 
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Proof. Necessity: 
Suppose r_1(cj) = F-1(cj), then there are two possibilities. 
(1) r-1(q) = r_1(cj) = 0. Then for all mscx  G MSC, there always exists a 
non — monitoring relation to both q and Cj. If for all mscx  € MSC, S(mscx) = Â, 
then according to Table 4.1, the status for both c, and Cj will be uncertain. All other 
connections will have a status of IF. Thus, these two connections will be Unidentified, 
and |  Unidentified connection\ > 1. 
(2) r_1(cj) = r-1(cj) ^ 0. Figure 4.6(1) shows a network which has 3 nodes and 
two connections, Cj and Cj. The only way to make F-1(c,) = F-1(cj) ^ 0 is to let node 
1 and 3 be monitor nodes and node 2 be non-monitor node, as shown in Figure 4.6(2). 
Figure 4.6(3) shows the monitor-segment graph G'. Suppose q is the OAF. Then both 
monitor-segments would have state A, which makes both q and Cj in uncertain status. 
Again, |Unidentified connection\ > 1. 
O 
£> 
=> 
0= 
(1). G(V, E) (2). G(V, E) (3). G'(V'.E') 
| | : Monitor node : Link 
Figure 4.6 Two connections with the same F-1(c) sets 
Sufficiency: 
Suppose \UnIdentified connection\ > 1. Then, there are only three possibilities: 
(1) at least 2 Unidentified connections have F-1(c) = 0. Arbitrarily pick a pair 
of connections Cj and Cj from this Unidentified connection set, and we get r_1(c;) = 
r-^Cj) = 0. Obviously, this contradicts our original statement of the theorem. 
(2) one Unidentified connection Cj has r_1(cj) = 0, and at least another Unidentified 
connection Cj has F-1(cj) / 0. Then, according to Lemma 2, in graph G', there exists 
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at least one edge (msCj,Cj) while S(mscj) = A. Because of r_1(ci) = 0, the monitor-
segment mscj has non-monitoring on c*. According to Table 4.1, if S(mscj) = A, then 
S(ci) = IF. Thus, Ci is not Unidentified. This contradicts the assumption. 
(3) at least 2 Unidentified connections have r_1(c) ^ 0. Arbitrarily select two 
connections c, and Cj from this set. There are two possible cases: 
Case I: r_1(cj) ^ F-1(cj). Suppose one monitor-segment msCi G r_1(cj) but msCi 
r_1(cj). Then, edge (msci,cj) does not exist in graph G'. Thus, monitor-segment rase, 
must have non-monitoring on Cj. Because q is Unidentified, according to lemma 2, 
S(msCi) = A, which implies that S(cj) — IF, referring to Table 4.1. Thus Cj is not 
Unidentified, which contradicts our assumption. 
Case II: r-1(c;) = r_1(q). This contradicts the condition. 
Thus, if r_1(cj) / r_1(cj), then |Unidentified connection\ < 1 always holds. • 
4.1.3 Global Status of a Connection According to Monitor-Segment with 
One-OAF Condition 
For a given monitor-segment msc;, there are only two relations between msci and 
an arbitrary connection cf monitoring or non-monitoring. Let monitoring and non-
monitoring relations be denoted by two values: 1 and 0, respectively. Then, a vector r 
can be used to denote such relation between msCi and all connections in the network: 
Ti = {Ti(Cj) \ Cj G C}, 
and a Relation Matrix R can be created as follows. 
r* 
\ ) 
^ n(c%) n(c2) ... ri(Cn) ^ 
rsW r2(cg) 7-2 (Cn) 
y ^m(Cl) 2) • • • Tm(Cn) J 
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where u(cj) denotes the relation between msq and Cj, i.e., 
{1, if msCi monitor Cj • 0, if msCi not monitor Cj 
With a given status of the monitor-segment, we can get the corresponding status of 
all connections. For example, in Table 4.2, according to the status of monitor-segment 
S,(lc2), the status of all three connections, S(ci), S,(c2), and S(c3), can be derived. 
Monitor-segment 1 c2 monitors C\ and c2, but does not monitor c3. Because <S(lc2) is A, 
according to Table 4.1, the status of c\ should be S(ci) = uncertain, the status of c2 
should be S,(c2) = uncertain, and the status of c3 should be <S(c3) = IF. Let us assume 
that there are a total of n connections and m monitor-segments in the network. Let 
vector Si(c) = {S'i(ci), $((%),... ,  Si(cn)} denote all connections' status given by msci, 
where Si(cj) denotes status of Cj derived from status of msci. 
Now, set two possible connection status, IF and uncertain , as 1 and 0, respectively. 
Similarly, set two possible monitor-segment status, A and Â, as 1 and 0, respectively. 
Then, according to the truth table, Table 4.1, we can derive Si(cj) from S(msci) and 
r;(cj): 
$(%) = g(mgCi) @ r;(cj); 
while Si (c )  from S(msc i )  and r|: 
Si (c )  — [S (msc i )  •  1 ]  ©  r t \  
where 1 is a 1 x n vector, and © is XOR. 
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Then, a Status Matrix can be obtained as follows. 
Si(c 
y Sm{c) J 
( 2i(ci) 5"i(c2) ... 6"i(c») 
%(ci) ^(cg) ... ^2(0.) 
= { 
y  Smi f i l )  •  •  •  S m ( c n )  J  
^  S (msc i )  ^  
S(msc2) 
x ? }  
/ ^ \ 
T2 
y  S ( rnsc m )  J y r m  j  
Let S(c j )  denote the logical OR of jth column in the above matrix, and let V denote 
the logical OR operation: 
m m 
S{c j )  =  \ /  S i (c j )  =  \J[S(msc i )  ©  r i (c j ) ] .  
i=l i=l 
Now, if we define a new operation * as: 
v  > n 
x * Yt = \J[x i  © Hi]  
i=1  
where it and are 1 x n  vectors and Xi  and % are their elements, 
then vector S(c )  can be denoted by S{msc i ) and its relation matrix as following: 
^(3 = f 5"(ci) ... g(c») 
S(msci) . . .  S(mscm) J* 
^  r i (c i )  . . .  nfa) ^  
y Tmipl) • • • y 
The global status of connection Cj can be obtained as 
Status of Cj = < IF ,  if S(c j )  =  1  
Unidentified, if S(cj) — 0 
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For example, as shown in Figure 4.5, if connection c\ is the OAF, then, S,(lc2) = 
A = 1, S(3C3) = A = 1. According to Figure 4.5(2), we can get the relation between lc2 
and other connections as 
Because S'(ci) = 0, connection cx must be the OAF in the network. 
4.1.4 Computational Complexity 
This method can be easily applied to any large or small size network. Let D(u) denote 
degree of node u. Suppose we have \M\ monitors in the network, and Max{D(m)} = 
d-M, m £ M, then the total number of monitor-segment will be no more than \M\ x o?m-
Also, if we assume that there are no more than \C\ connections in the whole network, then 
the relation matrix size will be no more than (\M\ x dM) x |C|. Thus, for determining one 
OAF, the computation complexity will be 0((\M\ x dM)2 x |C|), and the only operations 
needed in the computation are + and ®. 
ricz = {ric2(ci),ric,(c2),ric2(c3)} = {1,1,0}, 
and the relation between 3cg and other connections as 
^ = {rscstciXracafcgXrscW} = {1,0,1}-
Then, 
ricz(ci) ricsW) n%(c3) 
, r3c,(ci) 7-3^(02) rscaW , 
\ 
0 V 
1 0 
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4.2 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for k Crosstalk Attack 
in the Network 
In the previous section, we provided a necessary and sufficient condition for one-OAF 
diagnosable network. However, in most cases, attackers tend to introduce more than one 
attack signal into the network simultaneously. Thus, the capability to localize more than 
one co-existing attack signal in an AON is more important in practical respects. We 
extend the one-OAF-diagnosable condition into ^-OAF-diagnosable network [44]. 
4.2.1 Monitor-Segment 
We use the same concept of monitor-segment here as in the one-OAF-diagnosable 
network. However, the truth table in Table 4.1 will change. In a one-OAF diagnosable 
network, if status of one msc is A, then all connections not monitored by this msc can 
be automatically set to A. However, if there are more than one OAF in the network 
simultaneously, this conclusion is not true. Those connections not monitored by this msc 
can still be either OAF or IF. Table 4.3 shows the relations between a monitor-segment 
status and its monitoring connection's status. 
Table 4.3 Truth Table for monitor-segment and its monitor­
ing/ non-monitoring connections with more than one OAF 
in the network 
Relation S (msc) S(c) 
msc monitoring c 
{msc, c) 
A uncertain 
Â IF 
msc non-monitoring c A uncertain 
A uncertain 
The big difference between Table 4.1 and Table 4.3 is that in Table 4.1, an A status 
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monitor-segment implies that all its non-monitoring connections' status are IF, while 
in Table 4.3, an A status monitor-segment cannot imply that any of its non-monitoring 
connections' status is IF. 
Similarly, a connection is called Unidentified if we cannot obtain the status of 
the connection directly from the set of all monitor-segments' status in the network. A 
network and its connections are shown in Figure 4.5. If connection c% is the OAF, then 
according to the truth table we can identify the status for both the monitor-segments 
and connections, as shown in Table 4.4. The monitor-segments can only identify the 
status of c3 as IF, and status of connections c\ and c% as uncertain according to both 
monitor-segments' results. 
Table 4.4 Status of the connections and the monitor-segments shown in 
Figure 4.5 
monitor-segments S (msc) S(ci) SW) SW 
S(lC2) A uncertain uncertain uncertain 
S(3ca) À uncertain uncertain IF 
4.2.2 A>Crosstalk-Attack-Diagnosable Condition 
In this section, we establish the diagnosis conditions for ^-crosstalk attacks by using 
a set of lemmas, theorems, and corollaries. 
Lemma 3: If msc 0 r_1(c), c cannot affect the msc status even if c is an OAF. 
Proof. According to truth Table 4.3, no matter whether a connection c is in Uncertain 
status or in IF status, if a msc ^ r_1(c), then the status of this monitor segment msc 
is always unknown. 
• 
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Lemma 4: For a connection q ^ {c^,Cjk}, q G C and { c ^ , c J f c }  Ç  C ,  if Y 1(q) g  
r - i ( c j ) ,  t h e n  r - ^ q )  g  r - i ( c j ) ,  w h e r e  { c ^ , Ç  { e , , , .  
Proof. Since {c jm , . . . ,  c j n} Ç {cJt,c,J, U5=Jm r~' W Ç Uf=n r_1 (9) is always true. 
Moreover, since F-1(q) g UjLji ^_1(cj)) r-1(q) g Uj=Jm r-1(cj) is also always true. 
• 
Lemma 5: If a connection c is an OAF , then c must be in Unidentified status. 
Proof. If c is an OAF, all msc G F-1(c) are in A status, thus all msc G F-1(c) indicate 
that c's status is uncertain. According to definition, c is in Unidentified status. • 
Corollary 1: If there is a total of m Unidentified connections in the network, then 
there are no more than m OAFs in the network simultaneously. 
Proof If there are more than m OAFs in the network simultaneously, then according 
to Lemma 5, all these OAFs must be in Unidentified status, which contradicts our 
assumption. Thus, if there are total m Unidentified connections in the network, then 
there are no more than m OAF s in the network simultaneously. • 
Theorem 2: For any connection q 0 {c^,..., c^}, where q G C, and {c^,..., Cjk} Ç C 
is an arbitrary subset of existing connections in the network, if r-1(q) g Ujtji 
and there are k + 1 Unidentified connections in the network, then there must be at 
least k + 1 OAFs in the network. 
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. 
Initial step: suppose k  — 1. Then, r-1(cj) g for , Cj G C .  Assume an 
arbitrary pair of connections ca  and c& are Unidentified connections, but there is no 
more than one OAF in the network. There can be 3 possibilities. 
47 
1. There is no OAF in the network. Then, every msc in the network should be 
in À status, thus, all connections should be in IF status. This contradicts our 
assumption. 
2. One of ca  or cb  is an OAF. Without loss of generality, assume cb  is an OAF. Since 
r-1(ca) % r_1(ct), there exists at least one msc m such that m G r_1(ca) and 
m ^ r -1(c6). According to Lemma 3, cb  cannot affect the status of m. Then, m 
must be in À status, which implies ca is not an Unidentified connection. This 
again contradicts our assumption. 
3. Another OAF cm exists. According to the given condition, r_1(ca) g r_1(cm). 
Thus there exists at least one msc m such that m G F-1(ca) and m £ r~x(cm) 
must exist. According to Lemma 3, cm cannot affect the status of m. Then, m 
must be in Â status, which implies ca is not Unidentified connection. This again 
contradicts our assumption. 
Thus, the number of OAFs, \OAF\, is at least 2, which implies that this theorem 
is true when k = 1. 
Induction step: suppose this theorem is true for k — 1 (i.e., r-1(cj) g UjL~/i r-1(cj), 
where q ^ {c^,..., cjk_1}, q G C, and {c^,..., Cjfc_x} C C is an arbitrary subset of 
existing connections in the network), then there must be at least k OAFs in the network 
simultaneously if there exist k Unidentified connections in the network. 
Suppose r-^Ci) % [JjLj! r-1(cj) is true for all q ^ {c7l,..., }, and suppose 
k + 1 Unidentified, connections in the network are cnL, cnk+l. Since F-1 (c.i) <£ 
UjLj! r-1(cj), from Lemma 4, F-1(cj) g r_1(cj) is also satisfied. Since there 
are at least k Unidentified connections in the network, therefore there are at least k 
OAFs, cmi, ..., cmk, exist. According to our assumption, r_1(cni) g \JZ=mi F-1(cm), 
there exists a msc mscni such that mscni G r_1(cni) and mscni $ UmLmi r-1(cm). 
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According to Lemma 3, all cm G {cmi,cmk} cannot affect mscn i .  Thus there must 
exist at least one extra OAF that affects the status of mscni. Therefore, at least k + 1 
OAFs must exist in the network. Thus the theorem holds for all values of k. •  
Theorem 3 (Necessary and Sufficient Condition for /c-Crosstalk Attacks) : 
In a network containing up to k OAFs simultaneously, Vq, c^, ..., Cjk G C, Q 0 
{cji,..., Cjk}, if 
3k  
r 'W 2 U r " ' (= j )  
j=ji 
then for this network with the connection set C, \UnIdentified Connection\ < k holds. 
What this theorem states is that for one connection Cj and an arbitrary set of k 
connections {c^,..., Cjk}, where a is not in {c^,..., Cjk}, if the set of monitor-segment 
of connection Cj is not a subset of the union of monitor-segment set for connections 
{cjj, ..., cjk}, then there is no more than k Unidentified connection for this network if 
there are at most k OAFs existing simultaneously in the network. 
Proof. Necessity: 
Without loss of generality, suppose in a subset of k connections (i.e., {cju ..., C j k } )  all 
are OAFs. According to lemma 5, all OAFs are unidentified. Then, for some connection 
Ci {cj1,..., Cjk}, there are two possibilities. 
1. r_1(cj) = 0. Obviously, r_1(q) Ç Uj=ji r-1(cj)- Since there is no msc G F-1(q), 
Cj is unidentified. According to lemma 5, all OAFs are unidentified along with 
{cju..., Cjk}, and thus |Unidentified Connection\ > k, this contradicts our as­
sumption. 
2. r-1(cj) ^ 0 and suppose r_1(cj) Ç \Jjk=j l  r_1(cj). Then, for all msc G r_1(cj), 
msc G Ujiji r_1(cj) holds. 
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Obviously, all msc G {Jf=j1 F-1(cj) must be in A status. Therefore, msc G r-1(cj) 
are also in A state, thus q is also Unidentified and \UnIdentified Connection\ > k. 
This contradicts our assumption again. 
Sufficiency: 
Suppose |Unidentified Connection\ > k +1, and for every unidentified connection c, 
r-1(c) ^ 0. Assume that for any connection d and any arbitrary subset of k connections 
{ch,Ci {cjl}...,cjk}, r_1(ci) g r-1(c;) is always satisfied. According to 
Theorem 2, at this time, the number of OAFs is at least k + 1, which contradicts our 
assumption that there are no more than k OAFs in the network simultaneously. 
Thus, the theorem holds. 
• 
Corollary 2: For any connection c« ^ {cj i :  . . . ,Cjk} where q G C and any arbitrary 
subset {c^, ...,Cjk} Ç C in the network, if r-1(c,) g (J^ always true, then 
for m < k, 
1. there are no more than m Unidentified connections in the network if there are 
only m OAFs in the network; 
2. there are exactly m OAFs if there exist m Unidentified connections; 
3. if there exist m Unidentified connections, these m connections must be m OAFs. 
Proof. 1. According to the condition, if q is not an OAF, then F-1(cj) g |Jj=71 r_1(cj)' 
where Cj is one of m OAF connections, is always true. Thus, there exists a 
msci G r-1(cj) but msci 0 r-1(c,). According to Lemma 3, none of these 
OAFs can affect the state of msci. Thus, no connections except OAFs will be in 
Unidentified status. 
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2. According to Corollary 1, \OAF\ < m, while according to Theorem 2, |OA.F| > m, 
thus \OAF\ = m. 
3. According to result 2, if there are m < k Unidentified connections, there must 
be exactly m OAFs; while according to result 1, if there are m < k OAFs, then 
no more than m connections will be Unidentified connections. According to 
Lemma 5, all OAFs must be Unidentified connections. Therefore, all these m 
OAFs should be in Unidentified status. Thus, if there are m < k Unidentified 
connections in the network, these m connections must be the OAFs. 
• 
4.2.3 Global Status of a Connection According to Monitor-Segment 
As with one-OAF diagnosable networks, we can use matrices and their operations to 
denote the relation between the status of msc and connections. 
Again, let the two possible relations between a given monitor-segment msci and an 
arbitrary connection cf. monitoring or non-monitoring, be denoted by 1 and 0, respec­
tively. Then, a vector rt can be used to denote such relation between msci and all 
connections in the network: 
7" i  =  { j" i {Cj ) \C j  6  C} ,  
and a Relation Matrix R can be created as: 
nW ^ 
ra(Cn) 
5  
^raipn) J 
where n denotes total number of connections, m denotes total number of monitor-
/ 
ra 
ri(ci) ri(<%) 
ra(Ci) rs(ca) 
\ rm(ci) rm(cz) 
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segments in the network, and r^c,) denotes the relation between msq and cy. 
1, if msCi monitor Cj 
ri(cj) = < 
0, if msci not monitor Cj 
With a given status of the monitor-segment, we can get the corresponding status 
of all connections. For example, in Table 4.4, according to the status of monitor-
segment S(3cs), the status of connection c3 ,  S(cz), can be derived. Let vector Si(c) = 
{S i (c i ) ,  S i ( c 2 ) , . . . ,  S i (c„)}  deno te  a l l  connec t ions '  s t a tu s  g iven  by  msc i ,  where  Si (c j )  
denotes status of Cj derived from status of msq. 
Now, set two possible connection status, IF and uncertain, as 1 and 0, respectively. 
Similarly, set two possible monitor-segment status, A and A, as 1 and 0, respectively. 
Then ,  acco rd ing  t o  t ru th  t ab l e  Tab le  4 .3 ,  we  can  de r ive  Si (c j )  f rom S(msCi) and  r i ( c j ) :  
#(9) = x n(cj)} © n(cj), 
while Si (c )  from S (msCi)  and rt is 
Si( c )  =  {[S'(msQ) • 1] x rt} © rt, 
where 1 is a 1 x n vector, x is AND, and © is XOR. 
Then, a Status Matrix can be obtained. 
( \ /%) %) ...  
%(ci) 6^2(02) ... %(o,) 
y S'm(ci) Sm(c.2) - - .  Sm(cn) J  
{[ 
^ S(msci) ^ 
S(msc2) 
\  S(mscm) y 
• t ]  x  rt 
\ r m  )  
/¥t\ 
r2 
\ r m  J  
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Let S(c j )  denote the logical OR of jth column in above matrix, and let \/ denote 
the logical OR operation: 
m m 
3(cj) = \/ x r;(cj)] @ n(cj)}. 
i—1 i—1 
Now, if we define a new operation * as 
n  
X * Y T  = \/{[^ X y i ]  ©  
i=1 
where ^ and are lxn vectors and and y, are their elements; 
then, vector S(c )  can be denoted by S{msc i )  and its relation matrix as follows: 
^(3 = ( %l) .. SW 1 
^ n(c i )  . . .  r i fe*)  ^  
S(msci) . . .  S(mscm) J * 
y 7"m(ci) • • • ^m(Cn) y 
The global status of connection Cj can be obtained as: 
,  ,  j IF, if S( c j )  =  1  
Status of Cj = < 
I Unidentified, if S(cj) = 0 
According to Corollary 2, if the status of connection Cj is Unidentified, then Cj 
must be an OAF. This provides the algorithm for locating the attack connections of 
each wavelength. 
For example, as shown in Figure 4.7, there are two crosstalk attack connections, c\ 
and c2, and c3 is non-attack connection. There are three monitor-segments: lc%, lc2, 
and 1 c3. According to monitor-segment definition, F-1(ci) = {lex}, r_1(c2) = {1 c2}, 
and r_1(c3) = {1 c3}. This satisfies the ^-crosstalk-diagnosable condition. Thus, we 
can determine which connections are attack connections according to these monitor-
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| | : Monitor node 
Ç )^ : Non-monitor node 
: Link 
—*- : Non-attack channel 
: Attack channel 
Figure 4.7 Two attacks in AON 
segments' status. In this example, relation matrix R is: 
^ riciW ric^cg) HeXca) ^ 
ric(ci) ric,(c2) riches) 
^ ricg(ci) ri^^) riches) ^ 
\ 1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
and the status of all monitor-segments is: 
3(mac) = ^ g(ici) 3(1,%) ^(Icg) 
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Thus, 
5(c$ = 5%%,) ^(cg) 
5"(lCi) ^(lC2) g(lcs) * 
/ 1 0 0 ^ 
^ nci(ci) ricXcz) HeXca) ^ 
ricz(ci) n^(c2) riches) 
rica(ci) nca(c2) nc,(c3) 
1 1 0 *  
0 0 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
Because S(ci) — 0, S(c2) = 0, and S(03) = 1, connections c\ and c2 must be the 
OAFs in this network. 
4.2.4 Computational Complexity 
Suppose we have \M\ monitors in the network, and Max{D(m)} = dM, m € M, then 
the total number of monitor-segment will be no more than \M\ x dM- Also, if we assume 
that there are no more than \C\ connections in the whole network, then the relation 
matrix size will be no more than (\M\ xdM) x |C|. The computational complexity of first 
part, [S(msci)] xM, is 0((\M\xdM)2x\C\), while the computational complexity of second 
part, two (\M\ x dM) x \C\ size matrices ©, is 0(\M\ xdMX |C|). Thus, for determining 
k OAFs, the computation complexity will be 0((\M\ x dM + 1) x \M\ x dM x |C|) = 
0((\M\ x du)*1 x ICI ), and the only operations needed in the computation are + and 0. 
Thus this method is scalable and can be easily applied to a large network. 
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CHAPTER 5 SPARSE MONITORING POLICIES AND 
ROUTING ALGORITHMS 
In previous chapters, we analyzed the AON node model, crosstalk attack model, and 
monitor model. Moreover, we proposed the monitor-segment concept. Based on this 
concept, we developed and proved the necessary and sufficient condition for identifying 
one malicious attack source on each wavelength in an AON. After that, we extended 
this result to a more general case and proved the necessary and sufficient condition 
for identifying more than one coexisting crosstalk attack source on each wavelength in 
an AON. Now, based on these conditions, we develop some practical sparse monitor 
algorithms to identify every crosstalk attack in an AON. 
5.1 Introduction of Monitor Placement Policies and Routing 
Policies 
According to previous analysis, to find out the exact location of the OAF in a network, 
we have to determine a monitor placement and a routing policy that work together in 
such a way that we can meet the necessary and sufficient condition. We cannot satisfy 
this condition if we ignore either of them. For example, according to Theorem 1, all 
connections except one should be monitored by at least one monitor-segment. Thus, if 
several connections neither traverse a monitor nor pass through those nodes next to a 
monitor, then none of these connections can be monitored by any monitor-segment, and 
we cannot determine the attack status of the network. Thus, we can understand the 
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reason why both monitor placement and routing policy are so important in the crosstalk 
attack detection and localization problem. 
Monitor nodes are used to provide monitor-segments for existing connections. Be­
cause the cost of monitors will be expensive in the near future, network designer cannot 
anticipate to put monitors on every node. Therefore, we propose a monitor placement 
policy to place monitors on some critical nodes only. For monitor placement policies, 
we anticipate providing answers to questions such as: Does sparse monitors provide 
sufficient diagnostic information for attack management system? How many monitors 
are required for diagnostic purpose? Is there any upper-bound or lower-bound for that? 
What is the relation between a monitor placement policy and its corresponding routing 
policy? How can a monitor placement policy affect the routing policy? 
In this chapter, several sparse monitoring policies are propsed. We prove that these 
policies satisfy our sufficiency conditions. According to the necessary and sufficient 
conditions, there is no special requirement for the number of monitors. The only lower 
bound is that there must be at least one monitor in the network so that monitor-segment 
required by diagnosis can be provided. The routing policy is totally interwoven with the 
monitor placement policy. With a given monitor placement policy, routing policy need 
to route connections to traverse some monitors or some nodes close to monitors to meet 
the requirements. Obviously, the fewer is the number of monitors in a network, the more 
restriction will be there for routing policies, and correspondingly, the higher blocking 
probability for connections. Monitor placement problem is studied in [40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. 
Because how to place sparse monitors in a given network is a difficult problem, only 
heuristic solutions are given in this chapter. 
Routing policies are always interwoven with monitor placement policies. In the area 
of routing policies, we want to solve the following problems: How should routes be 
assigned to connections in anticipation of crosstalk attacks? Does route assignment in 
anticipation of a coordinated attack use more resources? 
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According to the necessary and sufficient conditions, when a monitor placement pol­
icy is determined, the corresponding routing policy should guarantee that all connections 
should obtain a different monitor-segment set from other connection or connections. 
With this restriction, routing policies tend to use more resources to satisfy the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for diagnosis, and this always leads to higher traffic blocking 
probability. This is the tradeoff between monitor placement policies and corresponding 
routing policies. 
As in Chapter 4, we first propose algorithms for the special case, which is that only 
one OAF exists on any wavelength in an AON, and prove it to be sufficient to localize 
the OAF in an AON. Then we discuss the general case. 
5.2 Sparse Monitoring Policies for Single OAF 
First, we assume that only one OAF exists in an AON. Sparse monitoring solution 
with one-OAF condition has been studied in this chapter and are also presented in 
[41, 42, 43]. Before describing the algorithm, we need the following definitions. 
1. One-hop-distance monitor fOHM/- If a monitor is connected directly to a non-
monitor node u, then this monitor is an OHM to this non-monitor node. OHM(u) 
denotes the set of OHM for node u. 
2. Degree of a node: The degree of a node u is the number of links that intersect with 
this node, denoted by D(u). 
3. Pendant node: A node with degree one is called a pendant node. 
5.2.1 Sparse Monitoring Policy I 
To satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition proved in Theorem 1, we have to 
develop not only monitor placement policies, but also routing policies as well as test con­
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nection setup policies. The following section describes the policies required to guarantee 
a network to be an one-OAF diagnosable network. 
5.2.1.1 Description of Policy I 
1. Monitor placement policy 
To guarantee the exact location of the OAF in a network, we suggest the following 
sparse monitor placement policy. 
(a) for non-monitor node u, D(u) > 2; 
(b) a non-monitor node u must have D(u) OHMs; 
(c) a node u with a pendant node as its neighbor must be a monitor node. 
2. Test connection setup policy 
We assume that each link in the network is bi-directional so that there is a fiber 
for each of two directions in each link. According to our monitoring mechanism, 
there are two kinds of connections: one is the normal connection which is set up 
by users, and the other is the test connection which is requested by the network 
management system. A test connection is an important method in determining if 
a node is a PAN or not. We use the following rule to set up test connections: 
for a non-monitor node, if there is a normal connection on wavelength A termi­
nating at this node and no normal connection provides a monitor-segment on 
the corresponding link, then one test connection from this node to each OHM is 
needed. 
3. Routing policy 
To guarantee the exact location of the OAF in a network, we use the following 
rules to set up a connection: 
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(a) for any two of the normal connections (excluding test connection) originating 
from a same non-monitor node, at least one must pass through three different 
nodes, including source and destination; 
(If Vcj, Cj  e R,  and q = {u0, ...},&,= {u0,... }, then always 3{ua, u b ,  u c }  C 
d but  <f .  C j  o r  3{u a ,u b ,u c }  C Cj  bu t  (£  q . )  
(b) normally we use the shortest path algorithm except for the above case. 
According to our crosstalk attack model, the crosstalk attack only affects the same 
wavelength connection at the wavelength selective switch. To simplify our analysis, in 
the following parts we always assume that there is no wavelength converter in the whole 
network, and for each link only one fiber exists in each direction. 
In the following, based on previous models and policies, we prove that a network is 
always one-OAF diagnosable. 
Claim 1: With above monitor placement, test connection setup, and routing policies, 
a network with one fiber on each link and without a wavelength converter is one-OAF 
diagnosable on each wavelength. 
Proof. With a given network denoted by graph G(V, E), let M denote the set of monitor 
n o d e s ,  a n d  l e t  N  d e n o t e  t h e  s e t  o f  n o n - m o n i t o r  n o d e s ,  M  Ç  V ,  N  C  V ,  a n d  M { J N  =  V .  
Let C = R y T denote the set of connections in the network, where R is the regular set 
of connections, and T is the set of test connections. Let c; be a connection consisting 
of nodes {u0, «1, «2, Let [/(<%) denote the set of nodes on connection q's 
path. Then, c^- denotes an one-hop segment (uj —» Uj+1) on connection c,. 
First, in each link, we assume there is only one wavelength in each direction. 
1. According to the sparse monitor placement policy, for a non-monitor node each 
neighbor node must be a monitor node, which means on each link at least one 
node is a monitor node. Thus, for one connection c, at least one monitor node 
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m G U(c) .  According to the definition of monitor-segment, at least one monitor-
segment monitors this connection, i.e., F -1(c) /  0 holds V c € C. 
2. According to Theorem 1, for any arbitrary pair of connections, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a one-OAF diagnosable network is that the pair members' 
monitoring monitor-segments sets should not be the same. Now, suppose there 
exist two connections q and Cj such that r_1(q) — r-1(cj). There can be two 
possibilities. 
(a) At least one of them originates from a monitor node. Without loss of gener­
ality, we assume that q originates from monitor m. According to our earlier 
discussion about special cases of monitor-segment, any connection originat­
ing from a monitor can make up a special monitor-segment that would only 
monitor this connection. Thus, a monitor-segment mq made up by q and 
m does not monitor other connections including Cj, i.e., mq e r_1(q), and 
mq ^ r_1(q). Then, F-1(q) ^ F-1(cj), which contradicts the above assump­
tion. 
(b) None of these connections originates from a monitor node. Then, there are 
two possible cases. 
i. The sources of these two connections are different, i.e., q 's source is node 
rii, and Cj's source is node rij. Suppose F-1(q) = r_1(Cj). Because 
rii, rij are not monitors, {r^, rij} Ç (C/(q) fl U(cj)) must be true. For 
U(cj), UNN{rii,Cj) must be a monitor, then, monitor-segment {n; —> 
UNN(rii,Cj)} with monitor node UNN(ni,Cj) must be in r_1(q), but 
not in r-1(cj), thus, F-1(ci) ^ F-1(cj). This again contradicts the above 
assumption. 
ii. These two connections have a same non-monitor source node n. Accord­
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ing to routing policy, at least one connection should pass three nodes. 
Without loss of generality, let us assume that c, has at least three dif­
ferent nodes on its path, and the first three nodes on its path are: n, 
rrii, and Ui. For each link, because only one wavelength exists in each 
direction and at least one monitor node exists on this link, the first two 
nodes on c/s path should be n and rrij, where rrij ^ rrii and rrii U(cj). 
Now let us consider node Ui G £/(q): 
A. If Ui is a monitor node, then segment (m, -4- Ui) G U(ci) plus monitor 
Ui makes a monitor-segment that does not monitor connection Cj, 
thus, r_1(cj) ^ r_1(cj), which contradicts the above assumption. 
B. If Ui is a non-monitor node, then according to monitor placement 
policy, there should be at least one other OHM for node Ui besides 
monitor m,. We use m', m! ^ rrii to denote one of such OHMs. 
According to the test connection setup policy, either normal con­
nection segments or test connections should exist as —y rrii) and 
(ui -4- m'). If Ui G U(cj), then connection Cj should be monitored by 
a monitor-segment composed of segment (uj —> m,) and monitor rrii, 
while connection c, should not be monitored by the same monitor-
segment; or if Ui ^ U(cj), then connection c* should be monitored by 
a monitor-segment composed of segment (ui —> m!) and monitor m', 
while connection Cj should not be monitored by the same monitor-
segment. We can draw the same conclusion, r-1(cj) ^ F-1(cj), from 
both cases, and this also contradicts the above assumption. 
According to the above analysis, we know that we cannot find two connections in the 
network such that r-1(cj) = F-1(cj), based on previous policies with the assumption of 
one wavelength in one direction. Thus, under this condition, the network is one-OAF 
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diagnosable. 
Next, we need to prove that a multi-wavelength network can be one-OAF diagnosable 
for each wavelength if there is no wavelength converter. 
Although there are multiple wavelengths in the whole network, according to our 
crosstalk attack model, the crosstalk attack connection can only affect the same wave­
length connections at the wavelength selective switches. Therefore, a crosstalk attack 
on one wavelength does not have any affect on the normal connections on other wave­
lengths. We have already shown that we can diagnose all connections on one wavelength. 
Therefore, we can always detect OAFs on all wavelengths in the whole network, if there 
is only one OAF on each wavelength. 
In conclusion, as long as there is no more than one OAF on each wavelength and 
there is no wavelength converter in whole network, we can always localize the OAFs 
based on our models and policies. • 
5.2.1.2 Examples 
Figure 5.1 (1) depicts a 4-node bi-directional mesh network. According to sparse 
monitor placement policy, two monitor nodes are necessary in this network. Here, we 
choose nodes 2 and 4 as the monitor nodes and nodes 1 and 3 as non-monitor nodes. By 
considering that attack connections can only affect connections in same wavelength, to 
simplify our example, we assume that only one wavelength is supported in this network. 
Suppose we have some normal connections and only one of them is a OAF. 
The current normal connection set is: 
Normal connection set = {ci(l —»• 4), c2( 1 —> 2 —> 3), c$(3 —>• 4 —> 1), c4(3 —> 2 —>• 
1)}-
For each non-monitor node one normal connection exists from this node to every 
of its OEMs, thus according to our test connection setup policy, no test connection is 
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C 4  
C  3 
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| | : Monitor node 
-ra 
© '  
Monitor-Segments Connections 
-J C l C 2 C 3 C 4 
2C2 r i i i o" 
304 0 0 1 1 
4Ci 110 1 
4Ca L 0 1 1 1J 
: Link 
: Non-attack Connection 
O : Non-monitor node : Attack Connection 
(1) 4-node mesh with one OAF (2) Relation Matrix of monitor-segments and connections 
Figure 5.1 Diagnose the OAF in the network without test connection 
necessarily needed. 
Thus, the current monitor-segment set is msc = {2c2, 2c4,4cl7 4c3}, and the relation 
matrix between these monitor-segments and the connections is shown in Figure 5.1 (2). 
Let us assume that connection {c2( 1 -4- 2 —> 3)} is the OAF. Then, we can get 
the status of all monitor-segments immediately: S(2c2) = A = 1, £(204) = À = 0, 
5(4ci) = A = 1, and 5"(4cg) = A = 1. Thus, S (msc) can be obtained as: 
S  (msc) = (S'(2c2) S(2C^)  S (4C\ )  S (ACS) )  =  ( 1 0 1  1 ) .  
Then, vector S(c) can be obtained as: 
is# ^(ci) ^(cz) g(cs) S(C4) 
^ 1 1 1 0 ^  
10 11 
0  0  1 1  
1 1 0  1  
0  1 1 1  
= 10 11 
All S(c-[), S(cs)i and S(ci) are greater than 0, which means connections ci, c3, and 
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c4 are all IFs, while S(c2) = 0, which means that c2 is in Unidentified status. Thus, 
the only Unidentified connection c2 must be OAF. 
Now, let us assume that connection c3 does not exist. Then, according to our test 
connection setup policy, a test connection i3 is established from node 3 to node 4 because 
of a lacking monitor-segment on link (3, 4), as shown in Figure 5.2 (1). Then, as shown 
in Figure 5.2 (2), we can get the relation matrix of monitor-segments and connections. 
By using the same method shown in previous example, we get: 
S (  d )  S ( c j )  S ( u )  S ( c )  
10 11 
10 11 
/ 1 1 0  0  
0  0  1 1  
1 1 0  1  
0  1 1 1  
Still, we can determine the only Unldetified connection c2 as the OAF. 
C2 
Ci 
Monitor-Segments Connections 
ta 
1 Ci 
acz " 1 
2C4  0 
4CI 1 
* . 0  
Ci t.i C4 
1 0 0" 
I I : Monitor node 
(^) : Non-monitor node 
—• : Link 
*- : Non-attack Connection 
: Attack Connection 
: Test Connection 
(1) one test connection be setup in 4-node network (2) Relation Matrix of monitor-segments and connections 
Figure 5.2 Diagnose the OAF in the network with a test connection 
These two examples tell us that test connections will not utilize much of the resources 
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in the network. According to our test connection setup policy, a test connection is needed 
only if there is no monitor-segment on one link. If a test connection cannot be set because 
there are no spare resources on a certain link, then the resources must be used by another 
connection, which can be used as monitor-segment. Thus, test connections will not affect 
the network throughput. 
Now, let us consider two crosstalk attack connections on two different wavelengths, 
as shown in Figure 5.3. In this example, there are two wavelengths A% and A2 in the 
network, and we use two panels to represent them. There is one attack connection on 
each wavelength, connection {1 —> 2} on Ai and connection {1 -4 4} on A2. We can 
easily use the above matrix calculation to determine that these two connections are 
crosstalk attack. Because there is only one crosstalk attack on each wavelength, and a 
crosstalk attack on Ax cannot affect connections on A2, our method has already located 
the malicious connections in the network. 
| | : Monitor node : Link 
: Non-attack channel 
(^2) : Non-monitor node : Attack channel 
: Test connection 
Figure 5.3 Two attack connections on different wavelength 
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5.2.2 Sparse Monitoring Policy II 
The previous method still needs a lot of monitor nodes in a network. For example, 
almost half of the nodes in a mesh network are required to be monitors. To reduce the 
total number of monitor nodes in a network, another method is proposed. With this 
new method, fewer monitors are required in the whole AON. 
5.2.2.1 Description of Policy II 
1. Monitor placement policy 
Any non-monitor node u must have at least one OHM. 
2. Test Connection Setup Policy 
For any monitor or non-monitor node, if there is a normal connection passing 
through or terminating at this node, one test connection from this node to each 
OHM (if existing) is needed if no normal connection exists on the corresponding 
link. 
3. Routing policy 
(a) For any arbitrary pair of connections q and Cj, if neither source node is a 
monitor node, then, C/(c,) ^ U(cj) should be always satisfied; 
(If Vq,  C j  6 R ,  U ( c i )  =  {uj,. . . } ,  U ( c j )  = {%,...}, and it,, U j  ^ M ,  then 
[/(%) 96 %).) 
(b) for any arbitrary pair of connections C; and c7 which share at least one node 
u, if neither source node is a monitor node, then at least one of following 
conditions should be satisfied: 
(If V q,  Cj e  R ,  U (ci) =  {ui,. . .  } ,  U (cj) =  {uj,. . .  } ,  Ui,Uj 0  M ,  and u € 
{U(ci) fl U(Cj)} then:) 
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i. u is a monitor node, or 
(it G M, or) 
ii. either U N N ( u , C i )  or U N N ( u ,  C j )  should be a monitor node, or 
%) U Cj)} Ç M, or) 
iii. at least one node v ,  v  G U (q) but v  g  U ( c j ) ,  exists, such that D N N ( v ,  C j )  G 
M exists or one of its OHM m $ U(ci) exists. 
(3d G U ( c i )  but v  0 U ( c j ) ,  D N N ( v , C i ) G M or 3m  £  M ,  m  £  O H M ( v ) ,  
a n d  m  U ( c i ) . )  
(c) normally we use the shortest path algorithm except for as in the above cases. 
Comparing this policy with the previous Sparse Monitor Policy I where any non-
monitor node u requires D(u) OHMs, we see that this new method only requires one 
OHM for each non-monitor node. Considering the expense of a monitor, this is a big 
advantage. 
Claim 2: With the above new sparse monitoring policies, a network is one-OAF diag­
nosable. 
Proof. With a given network denoted by graph G(V, E), let M denote the set of monitor 
n o d e s ,  a n d  l e t  N  d e n o t e  t h e  s e t  o f  n o n - m o n i t o r  n o d e s ,  M  Ç  V ,  N  C  V ,  a n d  M [ J N  =  V .  
Let C denote the set of connections in the network. Let c* G C be a connection consisting 
of node {u0, ul: u2,..., uk,... }. Let C/(q) denote the set of nodes on connection Cj's path. 
First, in each link, we assume there is only one wavelength on each direction. 
1. According to the monitor placement policy, for a non-monitor node at least one of 
its neighbor nodes should be a monitor node, and according to the test connection 
setup policy, if there is a connection traversing or terminating at a non-monitor 
node, then there must be a monitor-segment between this node and each of its 
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OHMs. Thus, for one connection c, at least one monitor-segment monitors it, i.e., 
r-1(c) 7^ 0 is satisfied Vc G C. 
2. The necessary and sufficient condition for an one-OAF diagnosable network is that 
any arbitrary pair of connections, c* and Cj, should satisfy r-1(cj) / r-1(cJ). Now, 
suppose there exist two connection q and Cj such that r™1(ci) = r™1(cJ). For any 
arbitrary pair of connections, only one of following possibilities can be true. 
(a) At least one of them originates from a monitor node. Without loss of gener­
ality, we assume that c, originates from monitor m. According to monitor-
segment property I, any connection originating from a monitor can make a 
special monitor-segment that only monitors this connection. Thus, a monitor-
segment mci made by q and m does not monitor other connections including 
Cj (i.e., mci G r-1(c;)) and me, ^ r_1(cj). Therefore, F^(q) ^ F-1(cj), 
which contradicts the above assumption. 
(b) None of these connections originates from a monitor node. Then, there are 
two possible cases. 
i. U(ci)nU(cj) = 0: the connections do not share any nodes between them. 
Then, without loss of generality, assume G U(ci) but ^ U(cj), then 
one monitor-segment msc^m) made by node v and one of its OHMs m 
exists. Because msc^m) G but ^ T-1(cj), r_1(ci) ^ r_1(cj). 
This contradicts the above assumption. 
ii. U(cii) n U (c.j) ^ 0. Assume u G (U(ci) DU (c.j)). According to the routing 
policy, only three scenarios can be allowed: 
A. Node « is a monitor node. Then, because u cannot be the source 
node for both connections, either UNN(u,Ci) or UNN(u,Cj) must 
exist. Without loss of generality, assume UNN(u,Ci) exists. Then, 
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monitor-segment msc(UNN(U,A)^U) ,  made by (UNN(u, C i )  —Ï u ) and 
monitor node u, should be in r-1(cj). Because there is only one 
wavelength in each direction, UNN(u,Ci) ^ UNN(u,Cj). According 
to our monitor-segment definition, msc(uNN(u,Ci)^u) 0 r-1(c,), which 
means r-1(cj) / r-1(c,-): this contradicts the above assumption. 
B. U N N ( u , C i ) or U N N ( u , C j ) is a monitor node. Without loss of gen­
erality, assume UNN(u,Ci) G M exists. Then, for same reason as 
above, UNN(u,Ci) ^ UNN(u,Cj), and monitor-segment msc(u_>[/jVAr(u,ci)) 6 
r_1(cj) but 0 r_1(ci), which means r_1(ci) ^ r_1(cj): this again 
contradicts the above assumption. 
C. Node v  is only in either U ( c i )  or U ( c j ) ,  but not both. Without 
loss of generality, assume v G U(ci). According to routing policy, 
either D N N ( v , d )  G M  exists or for one of its OHM m  0 U ( c i )  
should be true. If D N N ( v , C i )  G M  exists, then monitor-segment 
msc(v^DNN(v>c4)) G r_1(cj), and since v U(cj), according to the 
monitor-segment definition, msc^DNN^v^) 0 r_1(cj), which means 
r-1(cj) 7^ r_1(cj): this contradicts the above assumption. If for one 
of u's OHM m 0 U(ci) is true, then monitor-segment msc(„_>TO) G 
r-1(c;). For the same reason, msc(w_>m) G r_1(cj), which means 
r_1(cj) ^ r_1(cj): this also contradicts the above assumption. 
According to the above analysis, we know that we cannot find two connections in the 
network such that F™1 (c,) = based on previous policies, with the assumption 
of one wavelength per direction. Thus, under this condition, the network is one-OAF 
diagnosable. 
Next, we need to prove that a multi-wavelength network can be one-OAF diagnosable 
for each wavelength if there is no wavelength converter. 
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Although there are multiple wavelengths in the whole network, according to our 
crosstalk attack model, the crosstalk attack connection can only affect the same wave­
length connections at the wavelength selective switches (homowavelength feature). There­
fore, a crosstalk attack on one wavelength does not have any chance to affect the normal 
connections on other wavelengths. We have already showed that we can diagnose all con­
nections on one wavelength. Therefore, we can always detect OAFs on all wavelengths 
in the whole network, if there is only one OAF on each wavelength. 
In conclusion, as long as there is no more than one OAF on each wavelength and 
there is no wavelength converter in whole network, we can always localize the OAFs 
based on our models and policies. • 
5.2.2.2 Connection Routing Algorithm in One-OAF Networks 
In this section we develop one practical routing algorithm. Without loss of generality, 
we develop a variant of the shortest-path algorithm that satisfies the above routing 
constrains. 
The pseudo code for the algorithm is given below. 
BEGIN: 
Given a node request. 
Run Shortest-Path-Algorithm to find the source-destination path. /*Test connec­
tions are ignored to compute the path and removed if the path uses those links with the 
test connections*/ 
IF Fail to find any available path, reject this request, 
ELSE find one path PI, 
IF source node s is a monitor node, 
THEN accept this request and setup this connection with path PI. 
ELSE source node s is a non-monitor node, 
Check number of nodes n on PI, 
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IF n > 3, 
THEN accept this request and setup this connection with path PI. 
ELSE check all existing connections originated from s, 
IF all existing connections' paths include at least 3 nodes, 
THEN accept this request and setup this connection with path PI. 
ELSE remove one link on path PI from original graph and reiterate the 
algorithm. 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
END 
Suppose the maximum output degree of network nodes is Max{D(u)} — rfjy, then, 
with this routing algorithm, at most connections need to be checked before we can 
make decision for the connection request. 
5.2.2.3 Example 
Figure 5.4 (1) depicts a 9-node bi-directional mesh network. According to the sparse 
monitor placement policy, only three monitor nodes are necessary in this network. Here, 
we choose nodes 4, 5, and 6 as the monitor nodes and the remaining nodes as non-monitor 
nodes. By considering attack connections which are homowavelength, to simplify our 
example, we assume that only one wavelength is supported in this network. 
Suppose we have some normal connections and only one of them is a OAF. 
The current normal connection set is: 
Normal connection set = {ci (1 —y 2 —y 3 —y 6), c2 (2 —y 1 —y 4 —y 5), C3 (3 —y 2 —y 
5 —y 6), 04(9 —y 6 —y 5 —y 4)}. 
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Connections 
C l  C  2  C 3  C 4  1  
" 1 1 0 0" 
0  0  1 1  
1 1 1 0  
1 0  0  1  
10 10 
0  1 1 0  
-0 0 0 1. 
-segments and connections 
Figure 5.4 Homowavelength crosstalk attack diagnosable network 
According to our test connection setup policy, no test connection is necessarily 
needed. Thus, the current monitor-segment set is: msc = {4c2,4c4, 5c3, 5c4, 6c1; 6c3, 6c4}, 
and the relation matrix between these monitor-segments and the connections is shown 
in Figure 5.4 (2). 
Let us assume that connection {ci(l —> 2 —> 3 —>• 6)} is the OAF. Then, we can 
get the status of all monitor-segments immediately: S(4c2) = A = 1, S(4c4) = Â — 0, 
S(5cs) — A — 1, 5(5c4) = A = 1, S(6ci) = A = 1, S^Gcg) = À = 0, and ^(6c4) = À = 0. 
Thus, S(msc) can be obtained as: 
S (msc) = (S'(4c2) S (4C4) S(5ca) ^(5c4) 5"(6ci) 5"(6cs) S'(6c4)) = (1011100). 
Then, vector 5(c) can be obtained as: 
Ci 
C 4  
(D"(D—(D 
| | : Monitor node 
(^) : Non-monitor node 
: Link 
: Non-attack Connection 
: Attack Connection 
Monitor-Segments 
' 1 
4C2 
4C4 
5C3 
5C4 
6Ci 
6C3 
6C4 
(1) 9-node mesh with one OAF (2) Relation Matrix of nr 
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^(3 = ( S(ci) g(%) ^(cs) ,%) 
/ 
1 0  1 1 1 0  0  
1 1 0  0  
0  0  1 1  
1 1 1 0  
1 0  0  1  
10 10 
0  1 1 0  
v 0 0 0 1 / 
o  1 1 1  y 
All values of S(c2), S(c3), and S(c^j are greater than 0, which means connections c2, 
c3, and c4 are all IFs, while 5(ci) = 0, which means that c\ is in Unidentified status. 
Thus, the only Unidentified connection c\ must be OAF. 
5.3 Sparse Monitoring Policies for More than One OAF 
The previous section provides the policies for One-OAF diagnosable networks, but 
how to place the monitors and set up test connections for more than one OAF is still 
an open question. Since increasing numbers of possible OAFs in a network necessitate 
increasingly complicated algorithms, only a 2-0AF diagnosable network is discussed 
in this section. First we propose a sparse monitoring scheme, which includes monitor 
placement as well as regular and test connection setting policies, then we prove that any 
network using such method is 2-OAF diagnosable. 
5.3.1 Sparse Monitoring Policy for 2-OAF Network 
1. Monitor placement policy 
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To guarantee the exact location of the OAFs in a network, we propose the following 
sparse monitor placement policy: 
(a) a non-monitor node u  must have D ( u )  OHMs; 
(b) a node u  with a pendant node as its neighbor must be a monitor node. 
2. Test Connection Setup Policy 
We assume that each link in the network is bi-directional so that there is a fiber for 
each direction in each link. According to our monitoring mechanism, there are two 
kinds of connections: normal connections which are set up by users, and the test 
connections which are requested by the network management system. Establishing 
test connections is an important step in determining if a node is a PAN or not. 
We use the following rules to set up test connections. 
Test Connection Set Up: 
For a non-monitor node u ,  if there is a normal connection c on wavelength A 
passing through or terminating at u, one test connection from node u to each 
OHM, except u's up-stream neighbor node UNN(u,c), is needed if no normal 
connection provides a monitor-segment on the corresponding link. 
3. Routing policy 
To guarantee the exact location of the OAFs in a network, we use the following 
rule to set up a connection. 
(a) If a connection q's source is a non-monitor node that is also on another 
connection c/s path, then, q must pass through three continuous nodes 
(ni, n2, n3) % U(cj) U U(ck), where ck / q, Cj is an arbitrary connection 
in the network. 
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(Vcj, Cj, cfe € C, C/(cj) = {«*,... }, and Ui 6 U(cj), then, 3{ni,n2,n3} C £/(ci) 
but (ni,n2,n3) g {[/(cj) U f/(cfe)}.) 
(b) Otherwise, any path selection algorithm, such as shortest path algorithm, can 
be used. 
According to our crosstalk attack model, the crosstalk attack only affects the same 
wavelength connection at the wavelength selective switch. To simplify our analysis, 
in the following parts we assume that there is no wavelength converter in the whole 
network, and for each link, only one fiber exists in each direction. 
In the following, we prove that a network is always 2-OAF diagnosable if it is designed 
using the models and policies described above. 
Lemma 6: If a connection q passes through 3 continuous nodes that are not in U ( c j ) ,  
then there is at least one monitor segment msCj such that msci G r-1(c,), but msq ^ 
r-'fe). 
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the 3 continuous nodes are {ni, n2, n3} in 
the direction of q. Because of the above monitor placement policy, if n2 is a non-monitor 
node, then both nx and n3 must be monitor nodes, otherwise, n2 must be a monitor 
node. If n2 is not a monitor node, then according to definition, monitor segment msci = 
(n2 -4 n3) G r-x(ci) but not in r-1(cj): this lemma holds. If n2 is a monitor node, since 
both ni and n2 are not in U(cj), then monitor segment msci = (% —> n2) 6 r-1(cj), 
but not in F-1(cj). Thus the lemma holds. 
• 
Claim 3: With the above monitor placement, test connection setup, and routing poli­
cies, a network with one fiber on each link and without any wavelength converters is 
2-OAF diagnosable on each wavelength. 
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Proof. With a given network denoted by graph G(V, E), let M denote the set of monitor 
nodes, and let N denote the set of non-monitor nodes, M Ç V, N C V, and M U JV = V. 
Let C = R\JT denote the set of connections in the network, where R is the regular set 
of connections, and T is the set of test connections. Let U(ci) denote the set of nodes 
on connection q's path. 
First, in each link, we assume there is only one wavelength in each direction. 
1. According to the sparse monitor placement policy, each neighboring node of a 
non-monitor node must be a monitor node, which means on each link at least 
one node is a monitor node. Thus, for one connection c, at least one monitor 
node m G U(c). According to the definition of monitor-segment, at least one 
monitor-segment monitors this connection (i.e., F-1(c) ^ 0 holds V c G C). 
2. According to Theorem 3, for any three arbitrary connections q, c,-, and c&, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for an 2-OAF diagnosable network is r_1(q) % 
r_1(cj) U r_1(cfc). Now, suppose r-1(q) Ç r-1(cj) U r_1(cfc), then there are two 
possibilities. 
(a) Ci s source node is a non-monitor node. Then, there are two possible cases. 
i. Connection Cj's source node n» ^ U ( c j )  U U ( c k ) .  Because at least one 
monitor exists on each link, DNN(rii,Ci) must be a monitor node. Let 
mi = DNN(rii,Ci). Since ^ U(cf) U U(ck), monitor-segment m,Cj 
can only monitor connection Cj, thus, r_1(c;) g F-1(c,-) U F-1(cfc). This 
contradicts the above assumption. 
ii. rii G U( c j )  U U( c k ) .  Without loss of generality, suppose n; G U(cf). 
According to routing policy, connection q should pass three continuous 
nodes that are not in U(cj) U U(ck). According to lemma 4, there is 
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always a monitor-segment msc* ^ F 1(cJ) as well as msci 0 F 1(cjfc), thus 
r-^Ci) % F-I(cj)ur-I(cfc). This again contradicts the above assumption. 
(b) Cj's source node is a monitor node. According to previous discussion con­
cerning special cases of monitor-segments, any connection originating from 
a monitor can make up a special monitor-segment that would only monitor 
this connection. Thus, a monitor-segment msq made up by Cj and m does 
not monitor other connections including Cj and c& (i.e., msci € r_1(cj) and 
msci r_1(cj) U r-1(cfc)). r-1(q) g F-1(cj) U r-Hc*): this contradicts the 
above assumption. 
From the above analysis, we know that we cannot find three connections in the 
network such that F-1(cj) Ç F-1(cj) UF-1(cfc) based on previous policies, with the 
assumption of one wavelength on one direction. Thus, under this condition, the 
network is 2-OAF diagnosable. 
In case of a multi-wavelength network, although there are multiple wavelengths in the 
whole network, according to our crosstalk attack model, the crosstalk attack connection 
can only affect the same wavelength connections at the wavelength selective switches. 
Therefore, a crosstalk attack on one wavelength does not have any affect on the normal 
connections on other wavelengths. We have already shown that we can diagnose all con­
nections on one wavelength. Therefore, we can always detect OAFs on each wavelength 
in the whole network, as long as there are no more than 2 OAFs on each wavelength. 
• 
5.3.2 Examples 
Figure 5.5 (1) depicts a 9-node bi-directional mesh network. In this example, this 
network is a 2 — OAF diagnosable network. According to our sparse monitor placement 
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policy, four monitor nodes are necessary in this network. Here, we choose nodes 2, 4, 6, 
and 8 as the monitor nodes, and the rest nodes as non-monitor nodes. By considering 
that attack connections can only affect connections in same wavelength, to simplify our 
example, we assume that only one wavelength is supported in this network. 
C 2 
Ci 
v i 
C 3  
C 4  
©~B 
Monitor-Segments Connections 
| | : Monitor node 
(^ ) : Non-monitor node 
: Link 
: Non-attack Connection 
: Attack Connection 
1 Ci 0
 
0
 
0
 
t3 tt 
2C 1 " 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 
2C 3 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1 
2ti 0 0 0 1  1  1  0 0 
4C2 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 
4C4 0 0 1  1  1  1  0 0 
6C3 0 0 1  0 1  1  0 0 
6C4 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 0 
6tt 1 0 1  0 0 0 0 1 
8C2 0 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 
8ta 0 0 1  1  1  1  0 0 
8b „ 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 0 
: Test Connection 
(1) 9-node mesh with two OAFs (2) Relation Matrix of monitor-segments and connections 
Figure 5.5 Diagnose 2 OAFs in a network 
Suppose we have some normal connections, two of which are OAFs. 
The current normal connection set is 
Normal connection set — {ci(1 —y 2 —y 3), c2 (1 —y 4 —y 1 —y 8), eg(3 —^ 2 —y 5 —y 
6), c4(9 —y 6 —y 5 —y 4)}. 
According to our test connection setup policy, for each non-monitor node at least 
one normal connection or one test connection must exist from this node to each of its 
OHMs, therefore the test connection set is 
Test connection set — {ti(5 —> 2), t2(5 —y 8), ts(9 —» 8) £4(3 —> 6)}. 
Thus, the current monitor-segment set is 
msc = {2ci, 2C3, 2tu 4c2,4c4, 6c3, 6c4, 614, 8c2,812, 813} 
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and the relation matrix between these monitor-segments and the connections is shown 
in Figure 5.5 (2). 
Let us assume that connections {ci(l —> 2 —> 3)} and {c%(l —> 4 —>• 7 —• 8)} are 
OAFs. Then, we can get the status of all monitor-segments immediately: S'(2c1) = A = 
1, S(2cs) = Â = 0, S(2ti) = A = 0, S(4c2) = A = 1, 5(4ci) = À = 0, 5(603) = A — 0, 
5(6c^) — À = 0, 5(6(4) = A = 1, 5(802) = A = 1, ,9(8Z2) = Â = 0, and 5(8(3) = Â = 0. 
Thus, 5(mscj is obtained as 
5"(msc) = ( 5(2ci) 5(2cg) 5(2(J 5(4cg) 5(4^) 
5(603) 5(604) 5(6(4) 5(802) 5(8(2) 5(8(3) ) 
=  ^ 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 ^ -
Then, vector 5(c) is obtained as 
S(C! = ( S(Cl) S(c2) S(c,) S(c4) s(tj) S(t2) S(i3) S(t4) ) 
0 0 0 ^ 
0 0 1 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 y 
=  ( 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) .  
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
/ 1 1 0 0 0 
0  0  1 0  0  
0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0  0  0  
0  0  1 1 1  
0  0  1 0  1  
0 0 0 1 0 
10 10 0 
0  1 0  0  0  
0  0  1 1 1  
\ 0 0 0 1 0 
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5(c3), 5(c4), 5((i), S((2), 5((3), and 5((4) are greater than 0, which means connec­
tions c3, C4, ti, t2, (3, and (4 are all IFs. Since 5(ci) = 0 and S(c2) = 0, it implies 
that both Ci and c2 are in Unidentified status. Thus, according to Corollary 2, the 
Unidentified connections c\ and c2 must be OAFs. 
Connections 
J t4 1 
0 0" 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0-
| I : Monitor node 
(^) : Non-monitor node 
: Link 
(1) 9-node mesh with one OAF (2) Relation Matrix of monitor-segments and connections 
Figure 5.6 Diagnose 1 OAF in a network 
Now, let us assume that only connection c\ is OAF in the same network, as shown 
in Figure 5.6. Because the sets of connections are the same in both cases, monitor-
segment set and the relation matrix will be the same as the previous example. Because 
we assume that connection {ci(l —> 2 —> 3)} is an OAF, then we can get the status of 
all monitor-segments immediately: 5(2ci) = A — 1, 5(2c3) = À = 0, 5(2(i) = À = 0, 
5(4c2) — A = 1, 5(404) = Â = 0, 8(603) = Â = 0, 5(664) = A = 0, 5(6(4) = A — 1, 
5(8C2) = A = 0, 5(8(2) = A = 0, and 5(8(3) — A = 0. Thus, S (msc) is obtained as 
S(mgc) = ( 5(2ci) 5(2c3) 5(2(J 5(4%) 5(4c4) 
5(6C3) 5(6C4) 5(6(4) 5(8C2) 5(8(2) 5(8(3) ) 
=  ( ^ 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  
C1 
C2 
Monitor-Segments 
C 3 t4 
1 C1C2C3 C4 ti t2 t:
2C1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2C3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2ti 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4C2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
4C4 0 0 1 1 1 1 
6C3 0 0 1 0 1 1 
6C4 0 0 0 1 0 0 
6tt 1 0 1 0 0 0 
8C2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
8b 0 0 1 1 1 1 
8ts . 0 0 0 1 0 0 
: Non-attack Connection 
: Attack Connection 
•>- : Test Connection 
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1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  
Then, vector S(c) is obtained as 
^ ( S(ci) 5(cg) 5(cg) 5(C4) 5((i) 5((2) %) ^((4) 
^ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ^  
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0  0  1 1 1 1 0  0  
0  0  1 0  1 1 0  0  
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0  0  1 1 1 1 0  0  
\ 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 / 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  y 
S(c2), S(c3), S,(c4), S fa), Sfa), S fa), and S fa) are greater than 0, which means 
connections c2, c3, c4, t\, t2, (3, and i4 are all IFs. Since 5(ci) = 0, it implies that only 
C\ is in Unidentified status. Thus, according to corollary 2, the Unidentified connection 
Ci must be the OAF. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we have discussed the physical security problems in an AON. 
Among all possible malicious attacks, we mainly focused on crosstalk attacks because 
its propagation capability can cause more harm than other kind of attacks. We studied 
the physical origination of crosstalk attack and its features and compared several avail­
able optical signal detection techniques. Then, we established a crosstalk attack model 
as well as a monitor model. Based on these models, the monitor-segment concept was 
developed and a necessary and sufficient condition for one-crosstalk-attack diagnosable 
network was given and proven. Next, we extended this result and proved the neces­
sary and sufficient condition for a more than one crosstalk attack diagnosable network. 
To implement such diagnosable network, we developed several sparse monitoring algo­
rithms for a one-crosstalk-attack diagnosable AON and a general case ^-crosstalk-attack 
diagnosable AON, respectively. 
Based on our research, we draw the following conclusions: 
1. It is possible to design diagnosable network with sparse monitoring as long as 
appropriate routing and test connection strategies are followed. The necessary 
and sufficient conditions for one-crosstalk-attack and ^-crosstalk-attack diagnostic 
networks have been proved in this dissertation. 
2. For a mesh network, less than half the nodes need to be monitor nodes to satisfy 
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one-OAF diagnostic purpose, and about half of the nodes need to be monitor nodes 
to satisfy 2-OAF diagnostic purpose. Considering the fact that the monitor devices 
are expensive, this really provides a big advantage. 
3. The complexity of our diagnosis algorithms is 0((\M\ x c?m)2 x |C|). Here |M|is the 
total number of monitors in a network, dM is the maximum degree of all monitor 
nodes, and \C\ is the total number of connections in the network. All operations 
needed in the computation are + and ©. Hence, these methods are scalable. 
4. Our algorithms need setting up test connections. These test connections will not 
utilize much resources in the network. According to our test connection setup 
policy, a test connection is needed only if there is no monitor-segment on a link. If 
a test connection cannot be setup because there are no spare resources in a certain 
link, it must be because that the resources are being used by another connection, 
which can be used as the monitor-segment. Thus, test connections will not affect 
the network throughput. 
6.2 Impact of Our Contributions 
Today's all-optical networks provide extremely limited attack management capabil­
ity. Although optical networking is one of the fastest growing areas in networking, even 
theoretical attack management research in the optical domain only skims the surface. 
Because the transparency characteristic of AONs means that data does not undergo 
optical-to-electrical or electrical-to-optical conversion, AONs introduce new physical 
layer mechanisms that change potential models of attack from those that are well known 
for traditional electronic networks. Thus, many security vulnerabilities that do not exist 
in traditional networks will occur in AONs. In a network without regeneration ability, 
a malicious connection, i.e., a crosstalk attack, can propagate from its primary source 
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to other nodes without losing its attack capability. This makes attacks detection and 
localization become much more difficult, and high data rates characteristic makes things 
much worse because even a very short time service disturbance means a huge data loss. 
To come up with a fast attack-diagnostic technique is extremely important for a AON 
management system. 
Among all possible attack methods, the crosstalk attack has the highest damage 
capabilities. The work presented in this dissertation is a pioneering effort on the re­
search in the area of crosstalk attack in AON. Since no prior work exists on complete 
modeling and analysis of crosstalk attacks using sparse monitoring, we, for the first 
time, have developed a complete crosstalk attack model, which includes the crosstalk 
attack's propagation feature. Moreover, we have also developed a monitor model for 
the detection purpose based on current available detection techniques and reasonable 
assumptions. We also developed a complete diagnosis algorithm to detect and locate 
the attack sources. 
The results of this research will enable us to design better and more efficient fault 
and attack tolerant optical fiber based network. Since the society is very dependent 
on fully functional computing and networking system, our research will have significant 
economic impact as well. 
6.3 Future Work 
The research reported in this dissertation can be extended in several different ways. 
The models we presented in Chapter 3 only focus on crosstalk attack. However, crosstalk 
attack may not be the only security problem that occurs in an AON. Other attacks, 
such as eavesdropping and correlated jamming attack, can happen in the network. More 
studies are required to understand the behavior of these attacks. Those attack models 
need to be established. Moreover, we assumed that the only attack that occurs in an 
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AON is the crosstalk attack described in Chapter 3. This assumption is not valid in the 
strict sense because different attacks can occur in the same network simultaneously. A 
more complex and flexible model may be developed if different attacks are considered in 
the same network. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions we proved in Chapter 4 are only valid for 
diagnosing crosstalk attacks only. A possible direction is to extend these conditions to 
be valid for diagnosing possible co-existing different attacks. 
Using sparse monitors to diagnose possible corsstalk attack is a new concept in the 
literature. However, only heuristic solutions for placing monitors and routing for one-
OAF and k-OAF diagnostic AON have been proposed in Chapter 5. More sophisticated 
analysis for the monitor placement policy, the test setup policy, and the corresponding 
routing policy need to be studied. Evaluation of the AON performance using different 
policies must also be investigated. A precise and comprehensive network cost model 
would be useful to determine an optimal solution. 
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